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xABSTRACT
While smart grid technologies are deployed to help achieve improved grid resiliency
and efficiency, they also present an increased dependency on cyber resources which may
be vulnerable to attack. This dissertation introduces three components that provide new
methods to enhancing the cyber security of the smart grid.
First, a quantitative exposure analysis model is presented to assess risks inherited
from the communication and computation of critical information. An attack exposure
metric is then presented to provide a quantitative means to analyze the model. The
metric’s utility is then demonstrated by analyzing smart grid environments to contrast
the effectiveness of various protection mechanisms and to evaluate the impact of new
cyber vulnerabilities.
Second, a model-based intrusion detection system is introduced to identify attacks
against electric grid substations. The system expands previous research to incorporate
temporal and spatial analysis of substation control events in order to differentiate attacks
from normal communications. This method also incorporates a hierarchical detection
approach to improve correlation of physical system events and identify sophisticated
coordinated attacks.
Finally, the PowerCyber testbed is introduced as an accurate cyber-physical envi-
ronment to help facilitate future smart grid cyber security research needs. The testbed
implements a layered approach of control, communication, and power system layers while
incorporating both industry standard components along with simulation and emulation
techniques. The testbed’s efficacy is then evaluated by performing various cyber attacks
and exploring their impact on physical grid simulations.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Dependencies on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have propagated
throughout our modern society. While these technologies present resounding benefits
across commercial, government, academic, and personal ventures their usage is contin-
ually hindered by our inability to engineer systems with adequate levels of security.
Malicious actors have continually abused security weaknesses by stealing confidential
data, compromising data integrity, and degrading system availability.
Critical infrastructure domains, such as transportation, chemical, medical, and energy
have also greatly benefited from ICT as a means to monitor and control various physical
domains. However, a successful attack against critical infrastructure may result in a
catastrophic impact to the economy, natural resources, and even human safety. These
systems often were not engineered to provide the robust levels of security needed to
protect against an increasingly hostile cyberspace. In addition, there is a current trend
to expand the connectivity of many critical infrastructure systems to provide improved
control and monitoring capabilities.
While all critical infrastructure domains inherit some risk from cyber attack, the
electric power grid is likely the most critical and vulnerable of these domains. The electric
grid is a core foundation of our modern society and is imperative for the operation of all
other critical infrastructure sectors. The grid is also more exposed to cyber attack than
many domains due to its large number of involved parties, primarily private ownership,
and heavily interconnected communications which leave it exposed to attack. In addition,
the grid is particularly vulnerable to large cascading failures due to physical phenomena.
2However, a cyber attack could potentially initiate equivalent failures.
While the electric grid has long been dependent on ICT to manage the various com-
ponents of the generation, transmission, and distribution systems, current smart grid
initiatives are focusing on expanding the use of ICT to modernize the current grid. How-
ever, this expanded use of ICT will lead to a greater attack surface which presents a
currently undetermined level of risk.
1.1 The smart grid
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified seven properties required for
a next generation power grid including attack resistance, self-healing, consumer motiva-
tion, power quality, generation and storage accommodation, enabling markets, and asset
optimization [104]. Smart grid technologies are being used to enhance all areas of the
electric grid, including the generation, transmission, distribution, and markets. Many
of these advances are enabled by continually improving communication and information
processing capabilities. The remainder of this section identifies smart grid initiative
impacts which cause significant influences on the use of ICT within the grid.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): AMI enhances electricity distribu-
tion by deploying smart meters at consumer locations with a goal to reduce cost, in-
crease electricity reliability, and support distributed generation. These meters provide
the customer with granular control over their consumption and also facilitate increased
integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Utilities benefit from being able
to remotely detect outages, perform remote meter readings and offer prepaid options
to customers. AMI also enables Demand Side Management (DSM) which exercises di-
rect/indirect control over consumer power consumption.
Wide Area Measurements Systems (WAMS): Increased grid monitoring tech-
niques are required to accurately analyze the flow of electricity through the bulk power
3systems. WAMS are predicated upon Phasor Measurement Units (PMU), which pro-
vide high sampling rates and accurate GPS-based timing to enable highly accurate and
synchronized phasor readings. While the deployment of PMUs provides increasingly
accurate readings, the full potential will not be realized unless these readings can be
shared among utilities and regulators. Additionally, power system applications must be
reviewed and redeveloped to determine the extent these granular readings may provide
to both grid efficiency and reliability. The development of advanced control applications
will depend on WAMS that will effectively distribute the information in a secure and
reliable manner.
Substation automation systems: To improve the performance and reliability
of device communication within substations, new communications paradigms are being
deployed. Older substations often utilized point-to-point communications and serial (RS-
232) physical layers. Newer substations deploy faster Ethernet networks which allow
multicast transmission of device status to provide real-time awareness of all substation
events. Improved field devices, such as Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), can be
deployed to perform more sophisticated operations, such as grid protection schemes.
Common Information Models (CIM): The smart grid will also increase the use
of CIMs to provide a common format for expressing and communicating the information
required to support the grid [42]. As the interconnectivity of smart grid systems increase,
CIMs will ensure the interoperability of these communications. Current CIM standards
such as IEC 61968, which primarily focus on distribution systems, and IEC 61970 for
transmission systems, are represented as an ontology that formalizes the information and
relationships necessary to support the grid [73]. CIMs have been primarily developed
to facilitate increased system integration through consistent data representation and
exchange formats.
41.2 Growing threats within cyberspace
Early computing technologies such as multi-user systems and networking created a
need for secure computer platforms. Since this time, both threats and cyber dependencies
have continued to evolve. The 1980’s presented the Morris worm, which was the first
example of self-propagating malicious software. This occurrence became prevalent in the
1990’s and early 2000’s with malware such as Slammer and Conficker which infected large
numbers of systems and inflicted a substantial economic burden to the victims [90][77].
While many of the early computer worms did not intentionally damage the infected
systems, more recently attacks have been used as a means to gain political and economical
advantage. In 2007 and 2008, sophisticated Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were launched
against the countries of Georgia and Estonia as a means to influence political agendas
[100].
While the large scale DoS attacks required highly skilled attackers, recent events sug-
gest the presence of increasingly sophisticated attackers. Attacker campaigns identified
by high sophistication, determination, and financial support have been coined Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) [43]. Intrusions such as Operation Aurora and Operation Shady
RAT represent to specific examples of APT type capabilities. Operation Aurora targeted
many large technology companies, such as Google, and exfiltrated large amounts of in-
tellectual property [70]. Operation Shady RAT demonstrated similar capabilities and
targeted over 70 companies and governments over a five year period [3].
As our nation’s dependency on cyber infrastructure grows, these systems become an
increasingly attractive target for well funded nation-state attackers. Many nations are
focusing on the development of cyber-based military capabilities [49]. For example, a
2009 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission claimed that
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sponsors cyber attacks targeting U.S. systems,
specifically focusing on espionage of military secrets [108]. Similar claims have been
5asserted by a recent report by Mandiant which identifies the PLA as the party respon-
sible for the infiltration of over 150 U.S. companies for the purpose of stealing valuable
intellectual property and other corporate secrets. The report specifically identifies Chi-
nese locations, military branches, and even the individuals responsible for many of these
attacks [65].
While the efforts of the PLA cyber capabilities are heavily documented, many other
sophisticated attacks have been identified within the past few years which suggest nation-
state involvement. Malware samples such as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, Gauss, and Shamoon
all include many advanced features which suggest nation-state involvement [26][11].
While the objectives of Duqu, Flame, and Gauss focus on traditional espionage ob-
jectives, Stuxnet presented a foundational shift in malware with its ability to usurp the
operation of an Industrial Control System (ICS).
Recent surveys have suggested that most critical infrastructure asset owners have
been targeted by some form of cyber attack [6]. However, Stuxnet remains the first
example of a sophisticated attack targeting the physical domain. Stuxnet’s key salient
feature is its ability to propagate malware into a control system and reconfigure the Pro-
grammable Logic Controllers (PLC) to perform potentially harmful actions [36]. While
it is speculated that Stuxnet targeted Iranian nuclear refinement facilities in order to
damage Uranium centrifuges, a similar attack approach could likely be used to target
other critical infrastructures in many domains, including the electric power grid, which
depends heavily on similar PLCs.
The U.S. government has recently identified the gravity of the these concerns. Efforts
such as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) have prioritized the pro-
tection of critical infrastructures, including the electric power grid [112]. Additionally,
the 2013 White House Executive Order, titled “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cy-
bersecurity” emphasizes the need for improved cyber security of critical infrastructure,
specifically identifying requirements for a “framework to reduce cyber risk to critical
6Figure 1.1 Power system domains[34]
infrastructure” and “information security measures and controls, to help owners and
operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage cyber risk” [113].
1.3 Vulnerabilities within the smart grid
The combination of an increasingly interconnected smart grid and growing sophis-
tication of cyber threats presents concerns for the grid’s current security posture. As
demonstrated in Figure 1.1, threats could target the generation, transmission, distribu-
tion, and market domains. In addition, each domain not only has a set of core operational
assets to defend, but must also be concerned with the exposure of their critical business
and corporate environments.
Unfortunately, as cyber security concerns have grown, researchers have begun to
identify many critical vulnerabilities within the communication protocols and software
platforms used to support the electric grid. Analysis performed by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have determined that
serious vulnerabilities are pervasive throughout ICS software platforms and network con-
7figurations [45, 46]. Additionally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
reported that these system lack relevant patches, maintain poor system configurations,
provide insufficient communication protection, and face a dearth of appropriate intrusion
detection capabilities [106][105].
Based on these findings, more secure systems must be developed to provide sufficient
resiliency to cyber attack. Although a wealth of research has been performed address-
ing traditional cyber security paradigms, many solutions do not adequately address the
additional constraints required to support the electric grid. The following list identifies
known constraints which result in deficient smart grid cyber security.
• Long system lifespans. Unlike more traditional IT systems, many systems within
the smart grid will be deployed for 10-20 years. This means more secure systems
cannot be deployed as cyber threats evolve.
• Heavy dependency on proprietary systems. Most proprietary systems do not have
well understood operations, which leaves the owners unable to make intelligent
decisions concerning their risk and what security mechanisms are appropriate to
protect them.
• Geographically disperse resources. Systems are strongly dependent on wide area
networks, which are more vulnerable to external attacks.
• Limited physical protections. Many systems are physically exposed, such as sub-
stations. This leaves them more vulnerable to physical tampering.
• Real-time requirements. Many security mechanisms, such as cryptography, cause
unacceptable overhead on the communication. Therefore, systems with real-time
requirements often cannot adopt many security controls.
• Restricted use of “fail-closed” security mechanisms. Systems need to be accessible
by operators in critical situations and, therefore, cannot restrict access to operators
8if they are unable to authenticate.
The previously identified concerns have been recognized by both the U.S. government
and electric industry. Table 1.1 identifies roadmaps and security guidelines addressing
smart grid cyber security. There have been multiple initiatives by both parties to at-
tempt to improve the security. For example, the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) published the “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security”
specifically identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls required to provide a
robust cyber infrastructure [54]. Acknowledging future demands for both cyber security
and privacy for smart grid initiatives, NIST has released the NISTIR 7628, “Guide-
lines for Smart Grid Cyber Security” document to provide future guidance as cyber
assets proliferate throughout the electric grid [80]. This document identifies likely cyber
architectures, enumerates required research initiatives, and documents critical security
controls.
In the private sector, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
has also acknowledged the threat to the electric grid. In 2009 they released the “High-
Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System” report
which enumerated major threats to the grid, specifically those from coordinated attacks
which blend cyber and physical methods [52]. Additionally, NERC created a Cyber
Attack Task Force (CAFT) to explore cyber vulnerabilities in the grid and identify
feasible detection, deterrence, and response capabilities [84]. NERC also developed and
enforces a set of of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards which require the
identification and protection of all cyber assets supporting the bulk power system [82].
9Table 1.1 Roadmaps and security guidelines for cyber security concerns
Policies/Documents Issues Addressed
NISTIR 7628: Guidelines for
Smart Grid Cyber Security [80]
Provides a comprehensive overview of cyber secu-
rity concerns against various smart grid initiatives,
including current research efforts, and necessary
security controls for protecting the smart grid.
NIST 800-82: Guide to Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) Security
[54]
Identifies cyber security concerns within indus-
trial control systems (ICS), including SCADA,
distributed control systems (DCS), and pro-
grammable logic controllers (PLC).
GAO-11-117: Electricity Grid
Modernization: Progress Being
Made on Cyber Security Guide-
lines, but Key Challenges Remain
to be Addressed [107]
Assessments of NIST security guidelines, FERC
standards development, and key outstanding chal-
lenges including metrics, information sharing, in-
sufficient security engineering, and regulatory is-
sues.
The Future of the Electric Grid
(MIT) [68]
Identifies key grid communications, security lifecy-
cles, vulnerability sources, security regulatory is-
sues, and information privacy concerns.
High-Impact, Low-Frequency
Event Risk to the North
American Bulk Power System
(NERC/DOE) [52]
Identifies the grids inherent vulnerability to co-
ordinated attacks, common modal failures, and
APTs. Specifically from DoS, rogue devices, unau-
thorized access attacks, and malware.
NERC Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) [82]
Cyber security compliance requirements for criti-
cal cyber assets supporting the bulk power system.
NSTB Assessments Summary Re-
port: Common Industrial Control
System Cyber Security Weak-
nesses [46]
Reports results from numerous control system cy-
ber vulnerabilities assessments. Identifies com-
monly found weaknesses in software and networks.
Common Cyber Security Vulner-
abilities in Industrial Control Sys-
tems (DHS) [45]
Comprehensive results of various ICS-CERT re-
ports and assessments of cyber vulnerabilities
within various control system domains.
A Policy Framework For the 21st
Century Grid: Enabling Our Se-
cure Energy Future [99]
An official White House strategy to address fun-
damental concerns to the security of the nations
electric grid, specifically requirements for security
standards and developing a security culture.
Cross-Sector Roadmap for Cyber-
security of Control Systems [50]
A DHS funded roadmap of cyber security criti-
cal infrastructure, including stakeholders, current
challenges, and milestones.
NERC Cyber Attack Task Force
(CAFT) Draft Report [84]
Industry technical committee analysis of possible
attacks and responses, specifically focusing on co-
ordinated cyber attacks against the bulk grid.
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1.4 Research needs
The development of a secure smart grid requires a vast amount of research in many
domains. While many security technologies are available for traditional ICT systems,
they frequently aren’t usable for smart grid applications due to excessive overhead or
concerns that they may prevent an operator from accessing certain critical functions.
Therefore, novel approaches must be explored for these technologies. Additionally, cyber
security must be addressed from a cyber-physical perspective, thereby analyzing how
the grid’s physical systems attributes influence the need for security and tailors the
approaches to security. This research focuses on the latter point, specifically identifying
the following three core research needs.
1. Models and metrics for the smart grid cyber security which incorporate:
• the ability to quantify risk to a system,
• incorporates current smart grid information models, and
• provides flexibility for both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
2. Tailored intrusion detection approaches which:
• integrated with smart grid communication protocols,
• incorporates awareness of both cyber and physical anomalies, and
• enables the analysis of sophisticated, coordinated attacks.
3. Smart grid research testbeds that:
• accurately integrate both cyber and physical system properties,
• provides environments to explore cyber vulnerabilities and physical system
impacts, and
• supports evaluation of various novel security mechanisms.
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1.5 Thesis contributions
This dissertation is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of smart grid technologies and a background of
related work for this dissertation. The smart grid overview identifies how the grid
currently uses ICT to perform monitoring and control functions. It then introduces
new smart grid technologies and provides an overview of cyber attacks and how
they may impact the grid.
• Chapter 3 introduces work done on the development of security models and met-
rics specifically tailored for the smart grid. It first presents a graph-based model
representing the security mechanisms which protect the grid’s critical data from
attacks. Then it computes an exposure metric which represents the level of protec-
tion for each data item. It then demonstrates the metric’s applicability to various
security decisions such as analyzing the impact of a vulnerability and evaluating
the efficacy of different security mechanisms.
• Chapter 4 identifies novel approaches to intrusion detection for the smart grids.
It demonstrates how attacks to the smart grid differ from traditional attacks by
also incorporating smart grid commands. It then demonstrates how a Petri net
model can be used to identify whether a device causes a malicious communication
by modeling the set of preconditions necessary for an event. It then demonstrates
how events can be correlated hierarchically to more accurately analyze events.
• Chapter 5 presents the contributions in the development of a smart grid cyber-
physical security testbed. It introduces various research applications which depend
on testbeds and analyzes various trade-offs in testbed designs. It then provides an
overview of the development of the PowerCyber testbed. Finally, it demonstrates
12
the testbed’s utility with the execution of various integrity and availability attacks
which are then analyzed in terms of their impact on grid stability.
13
CHAPTER 2. SMART GRID BACKGROUND AND
LITERATURE SURVEY
The smart grid will combine both traditional electric grid control functions with
cutting edge technologies. Fig. 2.1 provides a high-level overview of the smart grid
including the various domains and systems found within it. This chapter provides an
introduction to the smart grid, known cyber vulnerabilities, and related research to this
work. It will first introduce the foundational domains of the electric power grid and
provide an overview of the SCADA architectures currently used to perform monitoring
and control. It then introduces various smart grid initiatives including AMI, WAMS,
CIM, and substations automation enhancements. The chapter then identifies the various
protocols used to support the various communications requirements and identifies various
cyber attacks that could be used by a malicious individual to damage the smart grid.
Finally, it presents a literature survey of works related to this dissertation.
2.1 Traditional electric grid overview
The electric grid can divided into four core domains, generation, transmission, distri-
bution, and third parties, such as markets and system regulators. These domains have
all been dependent on various ICT systems to support communication with other sys-
tems within the domain and externally. This section will explain each domain in greater
detail, along with the traditional Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
architecture used to support the communication and computation requirements
14
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2.1.1 Generation
The generation domains focuses on the production of electricity. Electricity genera-
tion is primarily done with a spinning turbine; therefore, most of the control algorithms
focus on managing the frequency, voltage, and power output of the generator. Multiple
control systems are required to support these algorithms. Local control systems include
Governor Control, which is used to control the generator’s frequency, and Automatic
Voltage Regulator (AVR), which is used to control the generator’s reactive power. In ad-
dition to these local control systems, generation must also communicate with third-party
balancing authorities to ensure each remains appropriately synchronized. The wide-area
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is used to perform this function by monitoring
and adjusting a generator’s frequency as loads change. In addition, generation systems
also must implement various protection algorithms to prevent against any physical faults
which may occur. This system is explained in more detail in Section 2.2.2.
2.1.2 Transmission
The transmission domain focuses on the transportation of high-voltage electricity
from large generators to the distribution domain. Control over the operation of the
transmission systems primarily occurs within substations where power lines intercon-
nect. Substations primarily support needs to convert power between different voltages
on neighboring lines and also provide a place to deploy various control mechanisms.
Transmission lines must be continually monitored to ensure that the load on the lines
does not surpass their physical limitations. This is performed with state estimation con-
trol algorithms, which is a wide-area monitoring system that collects telemetry from
power lines and transmits them back to the control center where they are used to cal-
culate the flow on the transmission system. Additionally, protection systems are very
important in transmission because the lines are physically exposed and are frequently
impacted by faults which perturb power flow. Protection schemes are implemented in
16
both wide and local forms.
2.1.3 Distribution
The distribution domain focuses on transporting electricity from the transmission
lines to the consumer through lower voltage lines. Distribution systems have traditionally
had less automation than the transmission and generation domains. Traditionally, load
shedding has been a primary control function within distribution, which uses breakers to
trip relays on distribution feeders. Similar to the generation and transmission domains,
the protection systems are heavily used within distribution systems to protect equipment
from faults.
2.1.4 Markets and system operators
There are many other functions which are critical to the grid’s daily operations.
Specifically, the oversight and management of the various utilities. Independent System
Operators (ISO) are authoritative parties that coordinate the generation and transmis-
sion amongst multiple utilities to ensure that load remains balanced. ISO also provide
markets that are used to balance the supply and demand of electricity between energy
producers and consumers. While the systems used to support these functions do not
perform control functions, they are critical for the grid’s daily operation.
2.1.5 SCADA architectures
The power grid has historically been dependent on SCADA technologies to perform
monitoring, alarms, and control functions throughout the generation, transmission, and
distribution domains. SCADA systems utilize a hierarchical paradigm where a central-
ized control center manages many geographically distributed field devices [54].
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2.1.5.1 Control centers
Control centers provide a central location for analysis and control over some section
of the grid, whether it be generation, transmission, or distribution. The control center
is typically staffed with operators that make human-in-the-loop control decisions over
many grid control functions. Control centers typically include the systems identified
below.
SCADA servers - SCADA servers manage the telemetry and control operations
between the control center and the field devices within the various substations. SCADA
servers are a critical component as they have the ability to send commands to the remote
field devices and are the central means for operators to evaluate the state of the network.
To obtain telemetry data, the SCADA server continually polls the field devices for state
updates. This collected information can then be shared with other SCADA systems such
as the EMS and Historian. Additionally, the SCADA server can also process any alarm
data correlating to any anomalous physical events.
Energy Management Systems (EMS) - An EMS utilizes SCADA data to perform
higher level analysis of a system state to analyze potential problems and mitigations.
Specifically, EMS are often used to execute generation control, state estimation, fault
location algorithms and contingency analysis.
Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) - HMIs provide an interface between the
operator and the SCADA and EMS systems. The HMI is typically a graphical user
interface (GUI) based interface that presents operators with the ability to analyze and
control the states of various system components.
Historian - A historian is a system which contains a database of events which oc-
curred on the physical system. The system is primarily used to analyze events off-line and
generally is not used for real-time functions like the other previously identified systems.
Control centers are dependent on both local and wide area communications. Local
Area Networks (LAN) support communications between all the control center devices.
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In addition, Wide Area Networks (WAN) are used to support communication between
the SCADA server and the various substations. These WAN connections are primarily
used to transmit the telemetry data and commands. Various forms of physical media
are used for this communication, however, these often consist of leased lines and wireless
microwave links. In addition, control centers often support some communication to non-
operational business systems in order to provide awareness about system operations to
other corporate entities.
2.1.5.2 Substations
Substations are where the SCADA technologies actually acquire the telemetry and
send commands to the various field devices to control the physical grid. Therefore, these
field devices provide the primary bridge between the grid’s cyber and physical domains.
Field devices typically include PLCs, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), and IEDs.
PLC - PLCs are legacy devices which typically execute some form of programmable
latter logic to control some physical systems. Often these devices have very limited
communication and processing capabilities. These are often implemented as relays in
control systems.
RTU - RTUs are also legacy devices which were developed to support communication
needs between field devices such PLCs and some other controller. Therefore, these
devices should have some ability to communicate over a network to support various
control requirements.
IED - While substations historically used PLCs and RTUs to obtain telemetry and
control actuators, recent trends are towards IEDs which have more capable computation
and communication capabilities. IEDs are currently heavily deployed to perform many
different functions such as controlling protection schemes and relaying telemetry from
power lines along with send device statuses.
19
Figure 2.2 Commodity vs. SCADA-specific ICT
Substation Automation (SA) Systems - Modern substations also implement
some SA system which provides a central system to manage the various IEDs, PLCs,
and RTUs found within the substation. In addition to providing a central control point,
these systems may also provide a human operator with a local interface to the substations.
2.1.5.3 Software platforms and communication protocols
While SCADA systems require many tailored communication protocols and software
platforms, they also incorporate many shared elements with traditional ICT systems as
demonstrated in Fig. 2.2. SCADA communication protocols are tailored toward trans-
mitting commands and telemetry data which requires strong availability and integrity.
Common protocols used within the traditional power grid include Modbus, Distributed
Network Protocol (DNP), Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process Control
(OPC), and Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP).
In addition to the tailored SCADA protocols, many standard ICT protocols are also
used to provide auxiliary services. Lower level protocols such as Ethernet and Internet
Protocol (IP) are common to provide the ability to route packets between networks.
Additionally, many higher level protocols are required to support both operations and
administrative functions. For example, Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to ensure
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that all systems have synchronized clocks which is imperative when transmitting teleme-
try data. Additionally, many administrative and management protocols are needed, such
as Telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP),
and Transport Layer Security (TLS).
In addition to the tailored software used for the power grid, these systems all cur-
rently depend on many standard platforms and communications found in ICT. Many
SCADA specific software products exist which incorporate the various protocols which
were previously identified. However, these products are often dependent on many com-
modity operating systems and services to support the SCADA applications. Commodity
operating systems such as Microsoft Windows and many Unix derivatives are commonly
used along with many different embedded operating systems. In addition, these software
platforms are also heavily dependent on commodity applications, such as web servers,
database servers, and file servers to support the SCADA functions. Therefore, electric
grid environments must understand risk from vulnerabilities which impact both com-
modity and domain specific systems.
2.2 Smart grid technologies and communications
Each of the previously identified electric grid domains has its own set of communi-
cation requirements to support its various control systems. Smart grid initiatives ex-
tend this dependency by integrating additional communication and control capabilities
throughout each domain. Table 2.1 presents an overview of the communications neces-
sary to support each smart grid domain, including the various applications enabled by
the protocols. Additionally, it identifies the communication protocols used to support
this communication and their needs for integrity (I), availability (A), and confidentiality
(C).
While key smart grid initiatives were identified in Section 1.1, this section will provide
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Table 2.1 Smart grid communications (I: Integrity, A: Availability, C: Confidentiality)
Domain Networks Application Security Protocols
AMI
Home
Areas
1. Consumption monitoring I - Med ZigBee
Network 2. Pricing information A - Med
C - High
Field Area 1. Usage data I - High ANSI C12.22,
Network 2. Update energy pricing A - Med ZigBee
3. Meter maintenance/mgmt. C - High
Distribution
Distribution 1. Distribution Automation I - High IEC 61850,
SCADA 2. Fault detection/mgmt. A - High DNP3,
3. Distributed energy resources C - Low Modbus
Distribution 1. Protective relaying I - High IEC 61850
Substation A - High
C - Low
Transmission/Generation
Transmission 1. Telemetry and control data I - High IEC 61850,
SCADA 2. EMS functions A - High DNP3,
C - Low Modbus
Transmission 1. Protective relaying I - High IEC 61850
Substation 2. Special protection schemes A - High
C - Low
WAMS 1. Publish PMU readings I - High IEC 68150-90-5,
2. Process external PMU data A - High C37-118
C- Med
Inter-
control
1. Generation scheduling I - High ICCP
center 2. Transmit grid status A - Med
C - Low
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an overview of the these technologies, their communications requirements, and potential
security concerns.
2.2.1 AMI
AMI attempts to reduce cost and increase electricity reliability through the deploy-
ment of smart meters at consumer locations. These meters provide the customer with
granular control over their consumption and facilitate increased integration of distributed
generation. Utilities benefit from being able to remotely detect outages, perform remote
meter readings, and offer prepaid options to customers. Because AMI requires that smart
meters be deployed at all consumer locations, deployments can range into hundreds of
thousands of devices for a large city. Each meter requires network connectivity back to
the utility in order to transmit usage, status, and control information. Therefore, AMI
deployments require large cyber infrastructures and many new technologies to meet these
demands.
While utilities will deploy smart meters to consumer locations, the meters also provide
consumers the option to deploy Home Area Networks (HAN) in order to integrate all
their devices and appliances. This will then provide the devices and appliances with the
ability to obtain real-time pricing which can then be used to schedule operations around
energy costs. However, HAN deployments will require communication interfaces between
the consumer and meter.
In addition to the HAN-meter interface, meters must also be able to communicate
with the utility to transmit control, pricing, and consumption data. This communication
is supported with a Field Area Network (FAN) that connects the smart meters back to a
AMI headend device. The FAN will support the communication requirements of a large
number of meters and must be a geographically disperse environment throughout both
urban and rural environments. Numerous wired and wireless communication protocols
have been proposed to support FAN requirements.
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AMI will also require additional communication and control technologies to manage
the large number of smart meters under their control, specifically the billing and meter
management functions. This includes methods to support communication between the
AMI headend, billing systems, and Meter Data Management Systems (MDMS). This
communication will likely occur within the segmented utilities network and will more
closely resemble traditional ICT systems.
2.2.1.1 Protocols
Multiple new network protocols have been developed to support the HAN and FAN
communication demands. This section introduces two leading protocols, ZigBee Smart
Energy Profile (SEP) and ANSI C12.22, along with their security attributes.
ZigBee SEP This provides a full protocol stack standard for HAN and FAN com-
munications, including link, network, transport, and application layers [118]. This stan-
dard natively supports AMI functions such as dynamic pricing, billing, and DER. Zig-
Bee SEP provides support for two different physical/data link layers including wireless
802.15.4 and power line carrier-based HomePlug. The network layer implements IPv6-
based routing protocols instead of mesh network approaches commonly found within
other ZigBee networks. The SEP application protocol is based on Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP) utilizing Representational State Transfer (REST) web services to
define domain specific event messages.
The standard also identifies numerous layers of security mechanisms to support AMI
communications. It proposes AES-based symmetric encryption algorithms, SHA family
hash functions, and various public key mechanisms (e.g., elliptic curve, RSA, Diffie-
Hellman). Additionally, the protocol provides support for secure transport layers with
TLS, secure network layers with IPSec, and a secure link-layer base on AES-CCM.
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ANSI C12.22 Another competing standard for AMI infrastructures is ANSI C12.22,
which extend upon previous meter reading standards, ANSI C12.18. ANSI C12.18
presents a standard for two-way meter communication, but focuses on optical ports,
C12.22 extends this standard to enable networked communication [4]. The standard
identifies various devices, including end devices (or meters), and communication relays
and gateways required to support routing. Security within C12.22 is supported with
symmetric key ciphers which utilize the EAX’ protocol to support both encryption and
authentication of meter data [76].
2.2.1.2 Security concerns
Specific cyber security concerns within AMI stem from the large-scale device deploy-
ments, dependency on embedded systems, and constrained network bandwidth which
limit security monitoring. Because the meter allows interactions from multiple parties,
specifically consumers and utilities, it will likely need to support remote access which
could be abused by an attacker. Additionally, because these meters are deployed through-
out urban and rural environments, the devices and communications are both physically
exposed leaving them more vulnerable to both physical tampering and cyber attack.
Traditional meters have long been a target for tampering by consumers in an attempt
to steal energy. This trend will likely continue with the transition to smart meters. While
tampering with traditional meters only allows energy theft, these techniques could prove
more damaging within AMI. Since a meter must be able to authenticate itself to the
headend devices, it must maintain some shared key or password within the meter. This
will be a likely attack target as it will allow the user to fabricate valid meter commands
and responses to utility requests.
The large scale of AMI deployment depends on a substantial number of authentication
keys. Therefore, key compromises must be considered probable occurrences and should
be engineered into system designs. Additionally, automated methods to update meter
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software and communication protocols are imperative to ensure security failures can be
quickly mitigated.
Unlike many other grid resources, data confidentially becomes increasingly important
as granular meter readings have been shown to strongly infer consumer’s at-home activi-
ties. Privacy issues currently hinder consumer acceptance due to concerns that data will
be provided to marketers, law enforcement, or other third parties. [33].
2.2.2 Substation automation systems
Substation communication previously relied heavily on dedicated wiring between
PLCs, RTUs, and physical devices such as transformers and circuit breakers. The IEC
61850 standard has been developed to support a networked approach in order to re-
duce costs and improve reliability [1]. This section provides a brief description of the
IEC 61850 protocol which is being used to incorporate increased ICT within substations.
IEC 61850 is unlike many protocols in that it also defines the following network elements:
• data models for devices,
• Substation Configuration Languages (SCL),
• the substation network architecture, and
• multiple communication protocols.
2.2.2.1 IEC 61850 data models
The IEC 61850 protocol implements a standard data model that provides a common
naming format for all devices, data objects, and attributes used to support the neces-
sary substation automation communication functions. This common naming structure
ensures interoperability of many different devices and presents easily understood naming
conventions for human interpretation.
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Table 2.2 Sample of IEC 61850 LN names and definitions
LN Definition
XCBR Switch with circuit breaker
TCTR Instrument transformer/transducer for current
CSWI Switch/breaker control
PDIS Distance protection
PTRC Protection trip conditioning
IHMI Human machine interface
RREC Recloser
RBRF Related function breaker failure
Physical devices are functionally divided into logical nodes (LN) based on the different
functions of the device. Each LN has a standard naming convection (i.e., XCBR) and
includes a set of data objects necessary to support the operation of that specific logical
node. Additionally, each data object possesses a set of data attributes necessary to
represent the operation of that data object. Data attributes can contain information
such as the object’s data type, valid ranges, and time stamps. Table 2.2 identifies
common logical nodes used in this paper and defines their name.
2.2.2.2 Communication protocols
IEC 61850 presents three different communication protocols for various communi-
cation needs. These are Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE), Sample
Values (SV), and Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) [75].
GOOSE is tailored for fast intra-substation communication with a focus on trans-
mitting information about substation events. GOOSE is based on a publish/subscribe
network architecture where each LN can choose the set of messages it subscribes to.
Communication is performed directly using broadcast and multicast Ethernet messages
between devices. Additionally, systems statuses are continually transmitted; therefore,
devices can identify when other device’s statuses change [2]. SV are used primarily to
transmit measurements from sensor to devices such as relays and IEDs. SV communi-
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cation requires low latency and is generally only transmitted across the local network;
therefore, SV packets are also transmitted directly in Ethernet packets. Finally, MMS
is used for client-server communication as opposed to the multicast Ethernet used in
GOOSE and SV. This supports needs to communication substation data with devices
on different networks, such as control centers or other substations.
Numerous substation automation functions are required to perform the required con-
trol, monitoring, and protection functions. Within IEC 61850 each function is supported
through various LNs communicating together. The remainder of this section will demon-
strate how various substation automation functions are performed with the IEC 61850
GOOSE protocol.
Control operations The remote operation of a circuit breaker is a basic sub-
station automation requirement. The breaker command, as demonstrated in Fig. 2.3,
originates fromep an operator located at a HMI, represented by the IHMI LN [75]. The
operator sends the command to the control IED, which is responsible for managing a
circuit breaker’s control state with the CSWI LN. The control IED then updates its
status, CSWI.Pos.ctlVal, to tell the circuit breaker to operate by updating the status
of XCBR.Pos.ctlVal. After this has occurred, the breaker should update open and its
current status, XCBR.Pos.stVal, should change to represent its new state.
Protection scheme operation: Fig. 2.4 demonstrates how a protection scheme
operation can be enabled by IEC 61850 based on work demonstrated in [2]. As demon-
strated in Fig. 2.41a and 1b, a protection IED continually receives the current and voltage
level from transformers. If the fault identification LN (e.g., PDIS) identifies a fault on
the line , it will update its fault status signaling the operation of the protection trip con-
troller, PTRC (2). When the protection trip control LN receives the fault identification
(3), it updates its status and sends a message to the circuit breaker. Once the circuit
breakers receives this command, it will trip to clear the fault and then update its status,
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Figure 2.3 61850 control operation
XCBR.Pos.stVal (4).
Because most faults are transient, once the breaker trips and the fault clears, the
breaker can be reclosed and the line can be re-energized. To enable the breaker reclosing,
a reclosure LN (RREC) will be enabled when it receives the PTRC trip status (3). This
initiates a timer in RRC which waits for the fault to clear. Once the timer expires,
the reclosure IED updates its status to identify the breaker of the reclosing (5). Upon
receiving this update, the circuit breaker will reclose and then update its status (6).
Breaker failure protection: Protection schemes must also incorporate methods to
deal with failures of circuit breakers. Various circuit breaker failures can occur, such as a
breaker not opening appropriately, or a breaker opening successfully, but not clearing the
fault. Circuit breaker failure functions attempt to mitigate both situations by sending
a breaker trip command to backup breakers which can then be tripped in order to clear
a fault. A breaker failure operation is initiated as soon as a fault is discovered by a
protection relay. Once this occurs, a timer is started to provide sufficient time so that
the primary protection relays to clear the fault. If the fault has not been cleared in this
time period, a command will be sent to operate backup circuit breakers.
IEC 61850 implements breaker failure protection through the RBRF LN as demon-
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Figure 2.4 61850 protection operation
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Figure 2.5 61850 breaker failure operation
strated in [21] and [115]. Fig. 2.5 demonstrates the sequence of a breaker failure opera-
tion. It begins similar to a normal protection function, except the added RBRF device
is enabled by the PTRC status (3). Once the RBRF timer expires, it verifies that the
breaker’s status has been updated to reflect the trip. If the fault has not been cleared,
a retrip packet will be first sent to the primary circuit breaker (4). If this does not clear
the fault, an external trip request is sent to the backup breakers with the RBRF.OpEx
packets (5). Once this data has been sent, the backup breakers should operate to clear
the fault.
2.2.2.3 Security concerns
Substations automation systems are critical to the reliability of the electric power
grid, especially in the transmission and generation domains. Substation communications
must also provide high performance. Many substation applications, such as protective
relaying, which requires tripping breakers to protect physical equipment from spikes in
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current, must be executed within milliseconds. Additionally, because substations are
geographically dispersed and often maintain limited physical network protections, they
are often very exposed to attackers.
An attack against a substation could have a major impact to the power grid. Research
in [15] proposed methods to compute how cyber attacks against a substation could result
in a loss of load. In addition, real-world situations have demonstrated that attacks to
relays could cause instabilities to generators and the grid’s voltage [117].
2.2.3 WAMS
Increasing strain on bulk transmission, dynamic generation due to renewable energies,
and increased sensing capability has instigated the development of WAMS to provide
increased awareness of grid status. PMU’s provide high sampling rates and accurate
GPS-based timing to provide highly accurate and synchronization of phasor readings.
While the deployment of PMUs provide increasingly accurate readings, the full potential
will not be realized unless these readings can be shard among utilities and regulators.
Additionally, power system applications must be reviewed and redeveloped to determine
the extent these granular readings may provide to both grid efficiency and reliability. The
development of advanced control applications will depend on WAMS that will effectively
distribute the information in a secure and reliable manner. Recently, the NASPInet
initiative has focused on developing an architecture sufficient for a North American
based WAMS deployment [20]. NASPInet has identified publisher/subscriber access
control mechanisms to support the dynamic sharing of PMU data.
Unfortunately, the development of a WAMS presents numerous cyber security con-
cerns [13]. The infrastructure must provide both high availability and integrity of the
PMU data, while also providing some confidentiality of certain utility data. The develop-
ment of such an architecture presents numerous constraints on the cyber infrastructure.
The support for confidentiality and integrity will be primarily based on cryptographic
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primitives specifically, asymmetric, public key cryptography. It must also provide sup-
port for publisher/subscriber access control mechanisms and multi-cast communications.
2.2.3.1 Protocols
IEC 61850-90-5 WAMS deployments will depend on the availability of effective
standards to storing and communicating PMU measurements. While the IEC 61850
standard primarily focuses on the substation automation identified in Section 2.2.2, IEC
61850-90-5 is an emerging standard that will support the need to transmit PMU mea-
surements across a network [67]. The standard expands upon the IEEE C37.118 standard
which focuses on data storage formats to also provide support of both serial and IP-based
multicast transmission. IEC 61850-90-5 maps PMU data formats into current IEC 61850
protocols to support communications with Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) and other
PMU devices.
2.2.3.2 Security concerns
The deployment of a WAMS presents numerous cyber security concerns [12]. The
infrastructure must provide both high availability and integrity of the PMU data, while
also providing some confidentiality of certain utility data. The infrastructure must si-
multaneously send PMU readings to many different parties to ensure everyone has a
real-time system view. Therefore, the infrastructure must utilize multicast traffic to
conserve network bandwidth. The design of adequate access control and authentication
is also challenging. Malicious individuals must not be able to spoof or modify PMU
messages as this would result in inaccurate utility estimations of the grid’s state.
2.2.4 CIM
The smart grid presents an increased need for CIMs to provide a common format for
expressing and communicating the information required to support the grid [73]. The
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development of standard data models provide consistent data representation to help facil-
itate improved interoperability, configuration, and management. Current CIM standards
such as IEC 61968 and IEC 61970 present ontologies that formalize the information and
its relationships. IEC 61790 presents a standard of the data objects necessary to sup-
port the transmission system. Data classes for this model include loads, measurements,
topologies, wires, generators, SCADA, and protection. Similar to IEC 61970, IEC 61968
provides an equivalent standard for the distribution systems. Core data classes for this
model include assets, consumers, work flows, and documentation.
The models provide a standard for data objects which may be stored and transmitted
in multiple different formats. Therefore, the use of CIMs also requires mappings to many
other data formats used in the smart grid. For example, Section 2.2.2.1 introduces the
data model used for the IEC 61850 protocol. Objects in this model can be mapped to
those in IEC 61790 to provide an overarching view of data used in various domains and
systems [42].
While CIMs have primarily been developed as a mechanisms to support grid inter-
operability, they also present a key element to understanding the security requirements
of the system by providing a mapping of data to the networks and systems that must
protect it. This research leverages these properties as a key component in understanding
impacts from cyber security failures.
2.3 Cyber threats to the smart grid
Attacks against the smart grid will likely differ from many traditional attacks against
cyber environments. First, an attacker must be able to compromise the grid’s cyber
elements. However, in order for the attack to cause negative system impact, the attacker
must also know how to control the cyber elements in order to manipulate the physical
system. Fig. 2.6 demonstrates this relationship.
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Figure 2.6 Attacks to the smart grid
An attacker could potentially use a number of approaches to compromise the grid’s
cyber resources. These resources will be the same set of devices and communications
previously identified. By compromising some set of cyber resources, an attacker can then
gain some degree of control over the various power applications. Depending on that set of
compromised power applications, an attacker may then be able to cause physical system
impact. Physical impacts could include grid instabilities, loss of load, and influencing
market prices. Work in [94] more thoroughly explores the set of power applications used
to support the various smart grid domains along with weaknesses in the supporting cyber
infrastructure.
This section will introduce potential attacks which could impact the communications
of smart grid, along with those that could compromise the sets of systems and devices.
2.3.1 Communications
As demonstrated in Table 2.1, the smart grid depends on many different communica-
tion flows which have varying importance and security requirements. If an attacker is able
to manipulate these communications, they could control the computations performed by
various connected systems which would then impact the physical grid. Potential attack
against communications include the following items:
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Spoofing - A spoofed message is one that an attacker injects into the network to
make it appear as if it originates from a trusted system. While this is possible in both
wired and wireless systems, the latter remain more vulnerable as the attacker can more
easily access the physical medium. Spoofing is generally prevented by employing some
form of cryptographic authentication which requires that the attacker sign or encrypt the
spoofed message with a shared or private key in order to verify its integrity. However,
the smart grid communications present numerous concerns, specifically because many
protocols were designed with inadequate authentication [47]. Additionally, the high
availability requirements and large number of devices present challenges when applying
more secure approaches [38].
Denial of Service (DOS) - Networks are vulnerable to DoS attacks if an attacker
is able to inject large number of packets into the network which cause congestion and
limits the network’s availability to the intended functions. While both wired and wireless
networks are vulnerable, wireless networks remain extremely vulnerable to DoS because
the physical medium cannot be more easily accessed by an attacker. Additionally, DoS
can also occur if a malicious packet causes the server to crash when attempting to process
the packet.
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) - The network is also vulnerable to many different
MitM attacks if the physical medium is not protected or the attacker can manipulate
some network address (e.g., Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)) or routing mechanisms
(e.g., Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)). If an attacker performs a MitM attack they
would be able to manipulate the authentic communications in transit. Because the smart
grid incorporates many new protocols for systems such as AMI, there are documented
concerns about possible routing layer vulnerabilities which may enable DoS attacks [80].
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Misconfigurations - Network misconfigurations also present serious vulnerabili-
ties to communication networks. Configurations in devices such as firewalls focus on
segmenting trusted and untrusted portions of a network. Therefore, a misconfiguration
of these devices may result in an untrusted user gaining access to critical system com-
ponents. Incorrect and insufficient network segregations have been identified as a core
concern throughout the smart grid [80].
2.3.2 Systems and devices
In addition to the communication networks, the systems and devices used to control
the grid are also vulnerable to attack. This section previously enumerated the common
types of devices found within the smart grid. The remainder of this section will identify
attacks against these systems.
Software vulnerabilities - Software vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, in-
teger overflows, and structured query language (SQL) injection, can provide an attacker
with the ability bypass authentication to usurp control of a system. Numerous recent
studies have suggested software vulnerabilities significantly plague smart grid systems
[47][24]. Additionally, control systems, such as the smart gird, are especially difficult to
patch due to a need for high up-time. This constraint will likely leave systems extremely
vulnerable to software vulnerabilities.
Authentication issues - Many devices within the smart grid do not use strong
methods to authenticate users. While devices are configured with default or weak pass-
words, additionally, many system features often completely lack authentication support
[114]. Authentication issues could provide unauthorized users with the ability to manip-
ulate system settings and operations.
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Malware - Malware is any malicious software which an attacker is able to execute
on a target system in order to usurp its control. While malware is frequently used for
data exfiltration in tradition ICT environments, malware which manipulates or denies
control of a physical system will likely be more damaging against the smart grid. While
researchers have proposed that malware could impact SCADA systems by injecting ma-
licious control communications [37], Stuxnet introduced the first real-world instance of
malware specifically infecting and performing nefarious actions within field devices [36].
Portable medial - Most smart grid devices are not directly connected to the un-
trusted Internet. While this significantly increases the difficulty for an attacker to ac-
cess the system, it does not provide complete security. A sophisticated attacker may
be able to transfer malware into the system use some form of portable media. Stuxnet
demonstrated that malware could infect air-gapped control systems by spreading through
portable media [36].
Supply chain - A supply chain attack could include any attacker technique that
compromises a system’s integrity before it is deployed. While attacking the supply chain
requires high sophistication, recent reports suggest many foreign network devices may
contain back-doors that provide access to unauthorized users [109]. Supply chain attacks
are similar to portable media in that they do not require an attacker to have physical
system access. Supply chain issues also incorporate the need for trusted system updates
and patches which have been used in sophisticated cyber attacks [27].
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CHAPTER 3. CYBER ATTACK EXPOSURE
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
The coupling of the power infrastructure with complex computer networks substan-
tially expand current cyber attack surface area and will require significant advances in
cyber security capabilities. Strong security metrics are necessary to ensure security-based
decisions accurately reflect a realistic understanding of cyber risk. NIST specifically ad-
dresses this requirement and recommends research in “tools and techniques that provide
quantitative notions of risks, that is, threats, vulnerabilities, and attack consequences
for current and emerging power grid systems” [80].
Attack trees and graphs have previously been used to model network security, un-
fortunately these models will not scale to large networks. While they provide detailed
information on potential attack methods, their development is based on an understanding
of potential attacker goals. Current trends show attackers increasingly rely on exploiting
zero-day vulnerabilities [101], which reduces the accuracy of models depending on the
evaluation of known vulnerabilities.
Developing security models for a large, networked environments such as the smart grid
should focus on the critical information necessary to support the grid and the resulting se-
curity mechanisms deployed to protect it. The electric grid can typically be categorized
into domains including generation, transmission, distribution, and market operations.
While a significant amount of intra-domain communication occurs, inter-domain com-
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munication is imperative for grid stability as shown in Fig. 1.1. Since inter-domain trust
is a key characteristic for grid communication, a strong security model must accurately
represent the trust levels and any associated risks.
Smart grid technology has developed increasing sophisticated common information
models (CIMs) which standardize the information necessary to support system opera-
tion and assist with increasing requirements for communication between domains. Fortu-
nately, CIMs also provide increasing awareness of information dependencies which should
be leveraged to improve cyber security. This research provides a novel network security
model tailored to provide a quantitative exposure metric based on these information
objects by identifying and analyzing their dependency on security mechanisms as they
traverse a network. This research also demonstrates how the exposure metric can be
utilized to perform various cyber security related activities such as vulnerability impact
analysis and security investment analysis.
3.2 Related work
Multiple research efforts have focused on the development of security models in order
to analyze and calculate metrics to represent a system’s resiliency to attack. Three
specific examples are attack trees, privilege/attack graphs, and attack surface metrics.
Each of these will be introduced below.
3.2.1 Attack surface analysis
Research on attack surface evaluation has been introduced by Manadhata and Wing
[64][63]. This work defines a service’s attack surface as the set of entry points, exit points
and data channels in a system and utilizes this information to produce quantitative
measurements of security. The relationship between excessive attack surface area and
decreased security is then shown through the comparison of similar software platforms.
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While this work is a useful component in software engineering, the metric requires a
formal review of software functionality and does not address the complexity of large-
scale, distributed systems.
3.2.2 Attack trees
An attack tree is a model which enumerates all potential vectors an attacker could
use to gain access to some target resource. Each branch in the tree represents a set of
intermediate steps the attacker must take prior to gaining access to the target. Previous
attack tree work by Ten has shown applicability to modeling SCADA cyber security [96,
98]. Attack tree models such as Morda demonstrate how system risk can be calculated
based on an understanding of attack objectives, strategy and potential mission impact
[35]. Unfortunately the development of accurate trees is a difficult process when attacker
capabilities and objectives are not well known.
3.2.3 Privilege/attack graphs
Previous work on security modeling was performed by Dacier, et al. through the
implementation of privilege graphs which evaluate various privilege states in a computer
system to determine whether known security states are violated [19]. This work was then
expanded upon to show that the transitioning between nodes in a privilege graph can be
used to model attacks against a system as an attacker escalates their privilege level [17].
In addition, this research addresses the relationships between security and various path
characteristics, specifically length and quantity [18].
Attack graphs take a different approach to modeling security concerns by producing
a privilege graph and analyzing the attack paths provided by all known vulnerabilities
[59]. Detailed analysis of feasible attack capabilities can then be determined to establish
whether critical resources are appropriately secured. Work by Wang, et al. has utilized
attack graphs for security metrics based on both path length and quantity [58]. Research
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performed by Idika and Bhargava has extended the path-based analysis by comparing
potential metrics [48]. While the attack graph approach provides comprehensive view of
a system’s security, the difficultly of the vulnerability discovery and mitigation process
reduces model accuracy and applicability to a large architecture with unknown vulnera-
bilities.
3.3 Exposure evaluation framework
The development of a secure infrastructure is contingent on the ability to accurately
assess the effectiveness of the current security mechanisms. The proposed framework
achieves this goal by evaluating all paths an attacker must take in order to access critical
resources. This work models the flow from security mechanisms to their protected priv-
ileges and the information accessible by that privilege. With this model the various sets
of security mechanisms required to protect information as it traverses through a network
can be reviewed.
The risk management process requires a comprehensive and continuous set of opera-
tions to ensure adequate system security. NIST provides a suggested framework which
identifies all required activities and details the efforts necessary to perform risk manage-
ment within industrial control systems [54]. The proposed exposure evaluation integrates
with NIST’s management framework to provide a more accurate assessment of risk. The
interactions between the risk management and exposure analysis framework are displayed
in figure 3.1.
The proposed model and metric leverage data from the security control selection
process to determine the set of implemented security mechanisms. These security mech-
anisms along with the system’s information model are necessary for the exposure graph
development, which is detailed in section 3.3.2. Once this graph has been developed it can
be utilized to compute the proposed exposure metric which is discussed in section 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.1 Attack exposure evaluation framework
The resulting exposure metric has applicability throughout the risk management process.
Proposed applications include:
• Security Control Selection - security mechanisms comparisons and investment eval-
uation
• Control Assessment - prioritization of security mechanisms and impact analysis
• Control Monitoring - security event impact analysis
3.3.1 Identifying cyber risk
Determining the set of security mechanisms required to support the cyber architecture
is a challenging research area. There are currently numerous risk management and
processes which require the implementation of baseline security mechanisms within an
environment [54, 82].
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Figure 3.2 a) Testbed network architecture, b) Testbed data flow diagram
44
Traditional computer security models attempt to evaluate the current state of a
computer and analyze whether the state corresponds to a known security status. A set
of security mechanisms or controls are utilized to restrict system use to only those secure
states. This paper presents a similar model based on a set of privileges, P , which identify
the set of available states in the systems. Each privilege represents user/system access to
some set of attributes within a CIM representation of the information within the system.
These attributes, or information objects, are represented by the set IO. The model also
assumes privileges are enforced with a set of security mechanisms, SM , such as access
control, authentication, and encryption.
To determine an appropriate set of security mechanisms this paper utilizes the Threat
Modeling process introduced by Microsoft [95]. The process first requires the identifica-
tion of users, processes, data flows, entry/exit points, and data stores within the archi-
tecture. Next, each of the data flows are reviewed for possible (S)poofing, (T)ampering,
(R)epudiation, (I)nformation disclosure, (D)enial of service, and (E)scalation of privi-
leges. The threat modeling process begins with the development of a data flow diagram
(DFD) which is then utilized to identify trusted boundaries and identify potential un-
trusted input.
The PowerCyber SCADA testbed at ISU, detailed in Fig. 3.2a), is utilized to produced
the example DFD between the control center and one substation in Fig. 3.2b) [40]. In
this example there are two trusted zone, the first is the control center where operators
interact with a human-machine interface (HMI) to control the SCADA server. This
provides the ability to remotely monitor and control the substation. The substation
contains a remote terminal unit (RTU) that aggregates data from an intelligent electric
device (IED), which performs various sensing and actuation functions. Additionally, all
data flows between trust zones are considered untrusted as they are potentially vulnerable
to external attack.
The information transmitted within the system is fairly limited. Since only one IED
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Table 3.1 Example security mechanisms and privileges
Systems
Security Mech./
Description
Privileges
VPN 1 Enc1 VPN encryption algorithm
Ath1 Management authentication
P1 VPN network access privilege
P2 VPN management privilege
VPN 2 Enc1 VPN encryption algorithm
Ath2 Management authentication
Enc2 Management encryption alg.
P1 VPN network privilege
P3 VPN management privilege
SCADA Ath3 Administrator authentication
Server AC1 OS access control
P4 Server access privilege
HMI Ath4 Operator authentication
P5 HMI access privilege
is utilized on each substation, only the following information is necessary to control the
IEDs from the control center:
1. Operate Breaker (Control Center → RTU → IED)
2. Status Reading (Control Center ← RTU ← IED)
3. Voltage Reading (Control Center ← RTU ← IED).
In order to protect this environment from cyber attacks, security mechanisms must be
provided to specifically target the untrusted areas. Fig. 3.3a) extends the original DFD
to model the necessary set of security mechanisms required to protect the system from
malicious attack. Table 3.3.1 explains these security mechanisms in greater detail. This
information will be utilized in the proposed model development along with the definition
of information necessary to support the system.
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Figure 3.3 a) Testbed DFD with security mechanisms, b) Resulting exposure graph
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3.3.2 Exposure graph development
This section introduces the exposure graph which formalizes the relationship between
the security mechanisms, privileges and information objects within a system. The rela-
tionship between these objects will then be evaluated to determine the exposure of the
information objects through the analysis of feasible attack paths. This exposure graph,
defined as the directed graph G = (SM,P, IO,A,E) contains the following vertex and
edge definitions:
• SM - vertex (security mechanisms)
• P - vertex (system privileges)
• IO - vertex (information objects)
• A - vertex (untrusted users)
• E - edges (directed)
Developing the exposure analysis graph should begin by identifying the untrusted
data flows within a network. This is modeled through a node, A, that represents potential
attackers access. This node should connect to all possible systems accessible by the
attacker. Since the system’s security policy should ensure untrusted users cannot access
any system resources without first bypassing some security mechanisms, all edges from
A should connect to the set of accessible mechanisms SM and apply an edge weight
of 1 to represent the attack effort required to bypass this mechanism. Each node in
SM should then be connected to the set of privilege nodes, P , representing the set of
privileges obtained if this security mechanism fails, these nodes should have a weight of
0. Edges can also exist between the privileges, as a privilege pi could dominated another
privilege pj if it contains a superset of privileges. In this case a directed edge would be
(pj, pi) added with a weight of 0. Finally information object, IO, nodes must be created
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for each object in the CIM for that architecture. A directed edge should then be placed
between each node in IO and the set of nodes in P that either consume or produce that
information. Fig. 3.3b) provides an example of the resulting exposure graph developed
based on the DFD in Fig. 3.3a).
IOExposureAnalysis
Input: G = ({SM,P, IO,A}, E)
Output: exp
for all io ∈ IO do
expio = EvalPath(io, {}, 0)
end for
EvalPath()
Input: node, V isitedSM, length
if node ∈ A then
return 1
max(len,0.1)
else if node ∈ P then
for all i ∈ incident(node)) do
evalPath(i, V isitedSM, length)
end for
else if node ∈ SM then
if node /∈ V isitedSM then
V isitedSM = V isitedSM ∪ node
for all i ∈ incident(node) do
evalPath(i, V isitedSM, length+ 1)
end for
end if
end if
Algorithm 1 Exposure analysis algorithm
3.3.3 Exposure evaluation
After the exposure graph has been developed, analysis can be performed to evaluate
the exposure of the information objects. The exposure metric exp determines the attack
surface of an information object as it traverses through various systems and networks.
The exposure metric is computed through the analysis of all security mechanisms utilized
to protect the set of privileges that either produce or consume the information object.
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Metric computation incorporates the number of attack paths through the security mech-
anisms protecting this asset while also factoring the path length as a method to evaluate
the effort required to exploit a path.
Algorithm 1 documents the exposure metric calculation for the information objects
within the graph G. Starting from each IO node, the algorithm identifies all privilege
nodes with incoming edges into IO. Each incident edge is reviewed for neighboring
nodes until the paths are traced back to A. Since edges incident to a element of SM are
assigned with a weight of 1, paths length will be determined by number of SM elements
within that path. Once a potential attack path has been traced back, the inverse of that
path’s length is the added to the exposure value for that information object. After all
relevant attack paths have been traced, the resulting expio value can be determined.
The documented algorithm outputs an exposure computation for each information
object. In this example, all three objects are communicated along the same path and
will result in the same exp value. For this example the computed exposure for all 3
information objects is 4. This score is determined as there are only four potential paths,
each with a length of one, required to access the IO set. These paths are {A, Ath1, P2,
P1, IO}, {A, Enc1, P1, IO}, {A, Ath2, P3, P1, IO}, and {A, Enc2, P3, P1, IO}. The
remaining paths are not relevant since once privilege P1 has been obtained the attacker
can gain access to the IO set without requiring any additional effort. Section 3.5 provides
a more detailed evaluation with increased exp variations.
3.4 Exposure metric applications
This section presents applications of the exposure metric to assist in the development
and management of a robust cyber infrastructure. Fig. 3.4 identifies three proposed met-
ric applications including: vulnerability and impact analysis, cyber security investment
optimization, and contingency analysis within cyber resources.
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Figure 3.4 Exposure metric applications
3.4.1 Vulnerability analysis
Computer systems are continuously affected with new vulnerabilities which present
security challenges and unknown system impact. As documented within the NIST Risk
Framework, continuous monitoring for possible security weaknesses is an important as-
pect of a strong risk management process. The first step in the monitoring process should
be the collection of new information on possible threats or attack trends. Information
sources should include security alerts from US-CERT and product vendors, individual
vulnerability assessment results, intrusion detection alerts and system events occurring
within the environment.
Exposure analysis should be re-computed during the continual monitoring process
and whenever significant changes have been found within system security mechanisms.
The re-computation should address all information sets that depend on the security
mechanisms in concern. For example, a failure of security mechanism smi will propagate
to some privilege set P ′ and also some information object set IO′. Determining the exact
exposure can be done by setting w(e({x}, smi)) = 0 where x represents all incident nodes,
since the mechanisms can no longer be trusted to protect the system. The resulting
exposure analysis should then be re-computed to determine the new, increased exposure
due to the shortening of the path lengths.
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Once the re-computation of all exposure values have been performed, the resulting
architecture can be reviewed for its adequacy. The vulnerability’s impact on critical
information may leave it in an unacceptably exposed state. In this situation additional
security mechanisms would be necessary. An example of this analysis is shown in Sec-
tion 3.5.2.1.
3.4.2 Cyber security investment optimization
Determining the effectiveness of cyber security enhancements presents a difficult strat-
egy in large, distributed environments. Numerous possible investment strategies could
be utilized to reduce the probability of a successful cyber attack. Two possible enhance-
ment, E1 and E2, may have very different impacts on an infrastructure’s security as
they protect different subsets of privileges on different systems. The exposure metric
provides a novel mechanism to compare the resulting additional security provided by the
additional enhancements.
Enhancements can be evaluated by redeveloping the SM set to represent the in-
frastructure assuming the enhancement has been deployed. Once the new graph has
been developed, the exposure can be re-computed and then utilized to compare various
enhancements to determine their ability to protect critical information objects. Sec-
tion 3.5.2.2 provides a detailed example of performing security enhancement evaluations.
3.4.3 Cyber contingency analysis
Traditional compliance within power system requires n-1 and n-2 contingency through-
out the physical components [81]. However, there is limited current understanding of
whether cyber architectures remain survivable during security failures. Cyber contin-
gency analysis should be targeted towards the information required to support the phys-
ical system. By analyzing IO sets and the SM sets that enforce the current security
policy, direct correlations can be made between failures of cyber security mechanism and
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Figure 3.5 Simulation AMI use cases
physical system occurrences. Additionally, this could instigate the development of cyber
contingency analysis policies which mirror those found within physical systems.
3.5 Metrics evaluation
To evaluate the metric’s applicability within a smart grid environment, this section
presents an example AMI architecture and then computes the resulting exposure calcula-
tions based on various cyber security relevant events. These results are then interpreted
to demonstrate the metric’s applicability to this environment.
3.5.1 Simulated environment
The simulated environment will model an AMI architecture that includes a HAN
domain containing user meter gateways, a NAN domain containing smart meters, and
FAN domain containing a AMI headend and Meter Data Management System (MDMS).
Both the HAN and NAN networks will be assumed to be using a wireless network such
as Zigbee while the FAN is assumed to utilize a wireless WiMax network.
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Table 3.3 Example set of information objects
Use Case Data Objects IEC 61968-9 [51]
Meter Reading
1. Read Request MeterReadSchedule
2. Usage (Response) MeterReadings
3. Usage (Protected)
Meter Disconnection
4. Off Message EndDeviceControl
5. Confirm: Meter EndDeviceEvent
Meter Firmware Upgrade
6. Firmware update EndDeviceFirmware
7. Execute firmware EndDeviceFirmware
8. Status check EndDeviceEvent
The information model for the simulation is based upon a subset of the AMI Use
Cases published by Southern California Edison’s (SCE) [93]. Fig. 3.5 reviews the use-
cases which provided a basis for system requirements for this simulation and demonstrate
the flow of information between systems.
Based on these use cases, Table 3.3 provides a description of the information ob-
jects referenced in Fig. 3.5 and also cites likely attributes from an IEC 61968-9 based
CIM. Future analysis within this section will reference the exposure of these information
objects.
A set of security mechanisms is also presented to provide a realistic set of protections.
Table 3.2 documents all of the assumed security mechanisms utilized to protect the
various systems and networks within this environment. The Protected Privileges column
is utilized to determine the set of systems privileges that are protected by the resulting
security mechanisms.
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3.5.2 Simulation Results
Based on the previously proposed environment we perform the resulting exposure
computation and then provide demonstrations of the impact on the systems security.
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Figure 3.6 Exposure metrics for normal/vulnerable scenarios
3.5.2.1 Vulnerability assessment
Fig. 3.6 provides the result from the exposure calculation on the simulation environ-
ment. The Normal State calculations provide the evaluation of a system that is operating
in its intended state and is not impacted from any outstanding security concerns. Note
that IO1-IO2 and IO4-IO8 maintain similar exposure values due to their similar paths
throughout the network while IO3 has a limited exposure based on an assumption that
certain granular meter readings with privacy concerns are protected by only being stored
on the meter. Next the exposure for the same architecture is evaluated with the following
two vulnerability scenarios.
• A. Compromised meter management authenticator
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• B. Vulnerable meter customer/management access control
Fig. 3.6 also provides the resulting exposure calculations after vulnerability A is dis-
covered. In this simulation it is assumed that vulnerability A has compromised the cer-
tificate utilized to perform meter management function which provides the attacker with
the ability to modify configuration data and obtain access to some usage data. Note that
the resulting exposure of all information objects except IO3 have significantly increased,
IO3 exposure still remains relatively low since the meter’s access control mechanism
enforces separation between granular customer reading and management functions.
Next, its assume that a vulnerability B is discovered which allows the bypassing of
the meter’s customer/management access control mechanism. This vulnerability signif-
icantly increases the exposure of IO3, but does not notably increase that of IO1 and
IO2 as they are already accessible from both the customer and management privileges.
Also, note that meter firmware upgrade information, IO6-IO8, and meter management
information, IO4-IO5, have been significantly increased. Since this information was orig-
inally protected from customer access, but now may be potentially exposed due from the
resulting vulnerability.
3.5.2.2 Security investment
In addition to the vulnerability and impact assessment application, evaluation results
have also been utilized to demonstrate the exposure metrics utility within the security
investment process. The current exposure value of various resources is first evaluated on
the system’s normal state, then the exposure resulting from the insertion of additional
security mechanism is performed and the resulting exposure is computed to evaluate the
improvement.
Fig. 3.7 provides the results of the enhancements. The x-axis contains the various
security enhancement results. The first set labeled ’Orig’ assumes no enhancement has
occurred. The next two sets of results assume that enhancement E1 and E2 have been
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Figure 3.7 Exposure after security enhancements
implemented individually while the final set assumes that both E1 and E2 have been
implemented together. The proposed enhancements for this evaluation include:
• E1 - Application layer authentication/encryption
• E2 - Tamper resistant meter hardware
The first enhancement, E1, assumes that the additional encryption and authenti-
cation is being performed on the meter application level (i.e. IEC 61850) which, for
example could be implemented by the IEC 62351 security protection standard. This
would increase the amount of effort required for an attacker to access this information
when it is in transit between the system. The second enhancement, E2, assumes a tam-
per resistant hardware is utilized within the environment which limits the smart meters
accessibility to physical attacks.
The results show that the additional encryption and authentication provide a greater
impact to the general system’s exposure and will likely constitute a more useful invest-
ment. This is primarily due to the fact that it protects information throughout its life
58
span as opposed to E2 which focuses primarily on the protection of data-at-rest within
the meter. However, the combination of both E1 and E2 further reduce the exposure
for the resources, although there still remains a number of potential attack vectors.
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CHAPTER 4. MODEL-BASED HIERARCHICAL
INTRUSION DETECTION FOR THE SMART GRID
(MHINDS)
4.1 Introduction
These concerns present a strong need for tailored security mechanisms, such as IDSs,
to be developed to ensure these systems can operate in a secure state. NIST 7628,
“Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security”, identifies the need for future IDS technology
with a “deep contextual understanding of device operation and state to be able to detect
when anomalous commands might create an unforeseen and undesirable impact” [80].
Attacks against the electric power grid will likely combine elements of traditional
cyber attacks, along novel techniques tailored towards smart grid elements. While a
major attack has not yet targeted the smart grid, the recent Stuxnet malware presents
an example of sophisticated cyber-physical attack [36]. Stuxnet provided an example
where a cyber attack propagated from traditional ICT systems into the control domain,
resulting in a malicious reconfiguration of field devices. Once this occurred, the field de-
vices were used to manipulate the physical domain by sending fraudulent control packets
to manipulate the operation of the attached centrifuges. While many current current
IDS techniques focus on detecting traditional ICT attacks, methods to detect malicious
control system communications are currently needed.
In a smart grid context, IDS approaches are needed which understand the models of
system communications and the smart grid applications which they support. Fig. 4.1
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Figure 4.1 Traditional IT and smart grid IDS approaches
demonstrates how traditional IDS approaches must be expanded to incorporate the
cyber-physical properties of the smart grid. While multiple research projects have fo-
cused on incorporating smart grid protocols into current IDS approaches, future work
is needed to demonstrate how these efforts can incorporate increased physical system
awareness.
This research presents a novel intrusion detection approach which specifically targets
the salient network characteristics of the smart grid. The proposed approach expands
upon current IDS efforts targeting the electric grid by exploring the networks data flows
required to support different power system applications. It then identifies how attacks
against the network will establish both temporal and spacial anomalies within the data
flows. This research then presents a Petri-net based model and associated algorithms to
detect attacks within individual substations and correlate them across the entire power
system.
4.2 Related work
IDS are a well explored research area within the computer security field. Numerous
approaches have been studied to characterize potential malicious activity within both
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computers and networks. IDS technologies are primarily categorized based on how they
gather information and analyze this information.
Information gathering techniques include both host-based and network-based approaches
[10]. Host-based intrusion detection methods focus on detecting malicious operations
within the software running on a system. This generally requires the installation of an
IDS agent on the host to analyze the various system calls and network activity in order
to identify malicious behavior. Network-based approaches focus on detecting malicious
activity based on the analysis of the network events.
IDS approaches can be further categorized by the method they use to distinguish
benign and malicious activity. These approaches can be categorized as anomaly-based,
misuse-based, and specification-based methods [10]. Each of these methods will be ex-
plained below, along with smart grid related research efforts.
4.2.1 Misuse-based IDS
Misuse-based IDS focuses on the development of signatures to match known nefarious
network events. This method is frequently used by many commercial IDS tools, such as
Snort, which performs pattern matching of all network traffic against a database of known
attack signatures [92]. Misuse-based IDS can generally perform highly accurate attack
detection, but their efficacy is predicated on the assumption that the database contains
signatures for all possible attacks against the system. If this assumption fails, an attack
will remain undetected. Specific misuse-based IDS research has been explored for various
industrial control systems. DigitalBond creates misuse-based IDS Snort patterns to help
mitigate against known control system vulnerabilities [28]. However, many unknown
vulnerabilities are likely to exist within smart grid control systems without published
signatures [46].
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4.2.2 Anomaly-based IDS
Anomaly-based IDS is based on the development of models representing normal sys-
tem behaviors and then using these models to flag anomalous system behaviors as po-
tentially malicious. Therefore, this approach does not fall under the same limitations of
signature-based IDS as it does not need to be previously aware of all possible vulnerabil-
ities in order to detect them. However, because not all anomalous behavior is actually
malicious, this often leads to high false positive rates from benign anomalies [39].
Numerous efforts have explored anomaly detection approaches within the smart grid.
Work performed by Rrushi has specifically targeted the operation of electric grid sub-
stations [87]. This work presented a probabilistic approach for detecting malicious IEC
61850 communication patterns based on stochastic models. While this work introduces
the probabilistic correlation of substation operations, it does not demonstrate how this
analysis could be fully incorporated into an IDS. Additionally, accurate probabilities for
this approach cannot be easily calculated. Ten, et al. explored methods to correlate
anomalous system functions with the impact the attack would have on the loss of load
(LOL) in a power system [97]. Anomalies in this work focused on authentication failures,
file system changes, and IED reconfiguration. While this work presents novel approaches
for correlating cyber and physical events, it does not explore the specific operations of
the smart grid communications and protocols.
4.2.3 Specification-based IDS
Specification-based detection methods require the development of formal specification
of normal system operations. The system state is then continually verified by the IDS
to ensure it does enter a malicious state. While specification-based can achieve low false
positive rates similar to misuse-based detection, developing the specification remains a
challenging task [103].
Specification-based IDS techniques have been explored for AMI by Berthier and
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Sanders [9][8]. This work develops specifications based on the ANSI C12.22 commu-
nication protocol for AMI and verifies both network and application layer properties.
While specification-based methods can accurately model the state of the network com-
munications, they have not been used to capture the physical system properties of various
smart grid applications.
4.2.4 Model-based IDS
Cheung, et al. originally explored the development of a model-based SCADA detec-
tion technique focusing on deriving detection methods based on the known characteristics
of the physical system and the intended operations of the supporting communication
network [16]. This work specifically analyzed communications following known static
communication patterns, hosts, and data values for an industrial control system.
MHINDS extends this approach by focusing on the development of a model-based
IDS for substation communications. It augments previous work by incorporating spa-
tial and temporal characteristics of substation application communication requirements
and physical system properties. Additionally, it demonstrates the feasible bounds for
detecting malicious activity in a substation based on known preconditions and through
the ability to correlate events across substations.
MHINDS utilizes a Petri net model to detect intrusions by modeling system states
and identifying malicious transitions. Petri net models has been previously used as a
means to perform pattern matching of malicious computer states [57].
4.3 Threats to substation automation functions
Substations present a serious threat from cyber attack because their systems have
weaker physical security than control center systems. Also, substations frequently de-
pend on unsecured wireless communication protocols. Attacks against substations could
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be catastrophic as the incorrect operation of circuit breakers could significantly impact
grid stability. For example, 75% of major grid disturbances can be attributed to the
misoperation of protection systems [110]. Therefore, this research will explore how in-
trusion against substations could lead to power failures based on known physical system
faults.
Substation automation functions include both human-in-the-loop and closed-loop
operations. Human-in-the-loop operations often include operators opening and clos-
ing breakers for maintenance purposes and manipulating tap positions on transformers.
Closed-loop functions, such as protection schemes, are used to de-energize lines in the
case of a fault to protect systems from damage. These systems rely on near real-time
operation and, therefore, do not depend on human involvement. Substation automation
applications are typically distributed across the substation’s various HMIs, RTUs, and
field devices. This work will specifically look at applications used to control the operation
of the circuit breakers and switches which are a core means for controlling power flow in
the grid.
4.3.1 Protection schemes
Protection schemes are a more complex substation function and are the core mech-
anisms of protecting power system components from various faults. Protection schemes
protect grid components, such as transformers and generators, from faults by initiating
the opening of circuit breakers and de-energizing the lines, thereby letting the fault clear
out of the system. Once the fault clears, the scheme can re-close breakers and allow
the grid to return to normal operating conditions. Protection schemes employ various
algorithms to infer faults in a power system based on inputs from current and voltage
transformers [102][55].
Protection zones: Protection schemes are designed around the components they in-
tend to protect. Major components such as transmission lines and buses will have
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schemes specifically configured to provide protection for faults on that component. The
schemes will then overlap due to the interconnectivity of components. Since a protection
schemes failure to operate may result in substantial damage, schemes are allocated into
zones which provide backup protection in case one device in a scheme fails to operate
correctly.
Protection reliability properties: The reliability of a protection scheme is defined by
the combination of its dependability and security [83], where security is referenced in the
power domain, as opposed to cybersecurity. These terms can be defined as follows:
• Dependability of the protection system can be defined as “the ability to detect
and respond to a fault in a correct and timely manner [102].” The electric grid’s
dependability is based on both 1) the protection schemes ability to detect the fault,
along with 2) the ability to differentiate the faults within or external to a breaker’s
protection zone.
• Grid Security of a protection system is defined as “the quality of not operating for
faults outside the zone of protection or not operating under heavy load conditions”
[102].
Substations are typically engineered towards dependability [25]. Protection scheme
zones provide added dependability as they ensure that faults are appropriately cleared
in the event of a failed relay. Additionally, these systems also incorporate breaker failure
functions to ensure nearby breakers can be tripped in the event of a failed breaker.
Substations have much lower margins for grid security. The misoperation of a protec-
tion function, such as a “undesired tripping” presents a major concern for power system
reliability [116]. Multiple undesired tripping will result in multiple lines being removed
from the power system, which has been demonstrated the protection scheme “hidden
failure” problem. This presents a clear violation of the grid’s N-1 contingency analysis
[25].
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Figure 4.2 Threats against grid security and reliability
4.3.2 Threat model
A cyber attack could result in the previously identified security and dependability
violations if it is capable of injecting or denying the required protection scheme commu-
nications. Fig. 4.2 demonstrates how cyber attacks which violate a system’s integrity
and availability requirements could result in security and reliability failures. In order
to initiate a failure to operate or an undesired tripping event, this research assumes an
attacker would able to compromise a substation devices, specifically a relay or HMI, to
send malicious commands. Therefore, MHINDS focuses on the identification of malicious
operations of the substation’s various systems by attempting to distinguish both benign
and malicious communications that could impact these reliability properties.
4.4 MHINDS detection methodology
The MHINDS intrusion detection methodology consists of three major components.
First, a model of a substation communication architecture is developed using a Petri net
representation of the various devices and communications. Next, the Petri net model is
used to monitor and detect malicious packets transmitted in the network at the substation
level. Finally, the results from the substation level analysis is used as an input for system
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Figure 4.3 MHINDS architecture and logical functionality
level analysis which correlates multiple substation inputs to detect coordinated attacks
and validate physical system events.
Fig. 4.3a) demonstrates the hierarchical approach of MHINDS. Agents are deployed in
substations to perform local detection algorithms and collect potential alerts. This data
is then transmitted back to the control center across the same communication channel
as the other SCADA information. Within the control center, system level analysis is
then performed on all collected data. Fig. 4.3b) presents a flow chart which documents
the flow of model development which includes network traffic, substation topologies, and
system wide topologies. Additionally, it demonstrates the flow of local alerts from the
station level analysis to the system level analysis components.
4.4.1 Substation level detection
The MHINDS detection algorithm is based on a Petri net model representing the
substation communications. Much of the information to develop this model is located
in the substation’s SCD file, including the various physical devices, logical devices, and
communications in a substation. This model will then be used to evaluate the network to
ensure it does not enter a malicious state. Once this model has been created, incoming
packets will be continually analyzed against the Petri net model to detect incorrect
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activity.
A Petri net model consists of a tuple, N = (P, T, F,M0), where P = {p1, p2, ...pm}
represents the set of places, T = {t1, t2, ...tn} represents the set of transitions, F ⊂ (P x
T ) ∪ (T x P ) is a mapping of the flow of markings between places, and M0 is an initial
marking. Additionally, σ represents the sequence of transitions that have previously
fired. This model also incorporates both cyber and physical system states and transitions.
These are divided into the following sets, Pp ∪ Ph ∪ Pd = P and Tp ∪ Tn = T , which are
further defined below.
• Pp - physical system states (e.g., breaker closed/tripped)
• Pd - cyber host states (e.g., device’s perception of a breaker’s status)
• Ph - current states of human operators (e.g., human initiation of a breaker com-
mand)
• Tp - physical system transitions (e.g., breaker closing/tripping)
• Tn - cyber network events (e.g., IEC 61850 message between systems)
For this work, an example substation will be demonstrated based on the control and
protection functions identified in Section 2.2.2. Table 4.1 identifies the elements that
will be used in this Petri net. Notice that the elements of Td and Pd contain the same
elements names. This is because the GOOSE communications publish their status to
the network as a means to communicated their state changes. A transition is defined as
firing when this status changes.
D represents the set of all devices in the substation where an individual device, di,
includes a set of places (LNs) and the transitions representing the published GOOSE data
for that LN. The set of published GOOSE data for each di will be the set d
t
i accordingly.
Based on the Petri net demonstrated in Fig. 4.4, these sets will be allocated as shown in
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 MHINDS Petri net places
Domain Device Elements
Pp - CB On CB Off Fault E CB Off
Tp - CB Off t CB On t Fault t
Ph d1 IHMI
Tn d1 IHMI t
d2 CSIW t
d3 PDIS t PTRC t RREC t RBRF t
d4 XCBR S On t XCBR S Off t
Pd d2 CSIW
d3 PDIS PTRC RREC RBRF
d4 XCBR S On XCBR S Off XCBR C On XCBR C Off
Figure 4.4 Substation Petri net model
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4.4.1.1 Identifying malicious devices
MHINDS detects malicious substation operations by verifying that all transitions can
be correlated by some set of enabling transitions which occur in either cyber, physical,
or human domains. A device, di, should only be able to initiate a transition if the set
of transitions which have enabled places of that device also fired. Therefore, MHINDS
classifies malicious and benign transitions as follows.
t =
 M + A[t] ≥ 0 t is benignM + A[t] < 0 t is malicious
The set of enabling transitions can be verified by inspecting the transitions and places
in the Petri net’s incidence matrix, A. A(m,n) is a matrix, such that A(i,j) = −x if x is
the number of markings which transition tj removes from place pi, while A(i,j) = x if
transition tj adds x markings to pi, finally A(i,j) = 0 if transition tj does not impact the
markings of pi. Below is an example of matrix A as defined for the example Petri net in
Fig. 4.4.
A =

0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 1 −1 0 0

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When a transition fires, MHINDS will attempt to validate whether the places which
enable that transition have sufficient markings. This set of enabling places, referenced
as E(dti), is defined below.
E(dti) = {p|Ap,t < 0 ∧ t ∈ dti}
Because MHINDS focuses only on network layer detection, it cannot validate the
markings of E(dti). Instead, it must identify malicious behavior by analyzing the presence
of the transitions that enable these places based on previously identified transition. The
set of transitions that can verify markings in the set E(dti) is defined as the set, V (d
t
i).
V (dti) = {t|Ap,t > 0 ∧ p ∈ E(dti)}
Based on this analysis, the various transitions in Fig. 4.4 will be explored for each
device to determine the set of transitions that must be explored in order to validate a
suspected transition.
4.4.1.2 Detection classes
This work proposes the following detection classes for transitions based on the infor-
mation required to validate their firing. These classes will then be used to explain how
the various transitions in Fig. 4.4 can be identified.
• Network Verified - The transition can be validated based solely on the presence of
previous network transitions, {∀t|t ∈ V (dTi )∧ ∈ Tn}.
• Physically Verified - The transition cannot be validated based solely on previ-
ous network transitions and requires additional analysis of physical system events,
{∃t|t ∈ V (dTi )∧ ∈ Tp}.
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• Human Verified - The transition cannot be validated based solely on previous
network transitions and requires additional analysis of operator actions, {∃t|t ∈
V (dTi )∧ ∈ Th}.
Based on these sets, Table 4.2 categorized all the devices located in the example
Petri net, including the transitions, impact, E(dti), V (d
t
i), and the detection class for
each transition.
4.4.1.3 Substation level detection algorithm
MHINDS implements a detection algorithm based on the previously identified ap-
proach for validating the firing of a transition. By exploring the transitions which cause
invalid markings it can identify what network packets should and should not be sent in
various states.
To perform this detection, MHINDS must store the current marking of the Petri net
Mc. Then all networked packets are correlated against known GOOSE messages and,
if they are identified as such, they should be converted to the appropriate transition,
t. The transition is then explored to whether Mc contains the appropriate places are
marked to ensure t can fire.
The proposed algorithm is identified below, assuming Mc is the current marking, β
represents an incoming GOOSE packet’s LN and object. β is first checked to see if it
resides in the set of valid GOOSE packets and flags an invalid formate alert otherwise.
Then it is checked to see if the transition is equivalent to a the current marking or repre-
sents an updated state. If its the latter, β is considered a new transition. This transition
is then checked to see whether it resides in the Physically Verified or Human Verified
classes which trigger the system level analysis algorithm.
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Input: Mc,β,SCD
if β ∈ SCD then
if βv 6= Mc(β) then
t← β
if t ∈ Physically Verified ∪ Human Verified then
SystemLevel()
else
for all i ∈M do
if Mi + Ai,t < 0 then
Alarm(Unreachable t)
end if
end for
end if
Mc = Mc + t
end if
else
Alert(Invalid Format/Source t)
end if
Algorithm 2 Station level detection
4.4.2 System level detection
As explained in Section 4.4.1.1 the operation of protection systems cannot be deter-
ministically detected due to the difficulty in verifying a fault. However, as identified in
Section 4.3, protection schemes rely on multiple layers of redundancy in order to en-
sure dependability. Protection schemes will generally have independent main, primary
backup, and secondary backup protection relays deployed to ensure a fault can be ade-
quately cleared. These relays are also typically allocated across multiple substations in
case a failure at one substation prevents a relay from firing. This section will demon-
strate how this level of redundancy can be leveraged to differentiate between benign and
malicious protection operations.
Fault location algorithms are a well studied research area for power systems which ex-
plore various methods of correlating relay and breaker operation data in order to identify
a fault while accounting for some degree of error in the protection scheme’s operations
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Figure 4.5 14-bus example power system [61]
Figure 4.6 Power system protection configuration [61]
[60][61][86]. This work proposes a similar approach to demonstrate how attacks causing
protection scheme operations could be detected.
Work in [61] introduces a 14-bus power system along with the logic for a set of pro-
tection schemes for both lines and buses. A line protection scheme will include main
(MLRXXYY) and backup relays (BLRXXYY) on both ends of the line to provide pri-
mary backup, where XX and YY reference the buses at each end of the line. Additionally,
secondary backup relays (SLRXXYY) will be included on substations adjacent to the
main relays to provide secondary backup. A bus protection scheme is intended to protect
a fault if it occurs on a bus. It will contain bus relay (BRXX) that trips all lines connected
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Table 4.3 Line and bus protection systems and relays
Fault Component Relays Substations
Line1314 CB1314 MLR1314 13
BLR1314 13
SLR1213 12
SLR0613 06
CB1413 MLR1413 14
BLR1413 14
SLR0914 09
Bus13 All BR13 13
CB1312 BLR1213 12
CB1306 BLR0613 06
CB1314 BLR1413 14
Bus14 All BR14 14
CB1413 BLR1314 12
CB1409 BLR0914 06
to a bus as the primary protection. As backup protection, it will use the BLRXXYY
relays in those substations adjacent to the bus. Table 4.3 identifies the main, primary
backup, and secondary backup protection schemes for line (Line1314) and for two buses
(Bus13 and Bus14).
4.4.2.1 System level detection algorithm
This section introduces a system level detection algorithm to help identify whether
breaker operations performed in substations can be validated by correlating events from
other stations. The algorithm receives data from the substation level analysis algorithm
and then determines whether the identified fault closely matches an expected protection
scheme.
Assuming a protection scheme operates correctly, a fault should cause the entire set
of relays in the device to detect the fault. Additionally, it should cause a number of
relays to trip to ensure it is properly cleared. Therefore, if a fault is identified by a
relay in a substation, it should also be identified by neighboring relays in neighboring
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substations. This analysis will be based on a set of protection schemes, PS. Each psi in
PS represents the set of relays used to protection bus or line i.
The algorithm’s inputs include σ and PS. For this application σ is assumed to only
includes relay pickup and operation transitions from all substations and human initiated
transitions. Additionally, θ is a threshold value that will be explained in Section 4.4.3.1.
The algorithm verifies that for each breaker operation command (e.g., PTRC) there is
a protection scheme whose associated relays have identified the faults. It does that by
comparing the expected fault pickup elements in each protection scheme to those found
in the set of protection related firings from the substation layer analysis. It then identifies
the best fit based on the maximum number of relay pickups found in both sets. Finally,
kPTRCi is compared to see if it meets some detection threshold and then otherwise raises
an alert.
Input: σ, PS, θ,
for all PTRCi ∈ σ do
kPTRCi = 0
for all psj ∈ PS ∩ PTRCi ∈ psj do
kPTRCi = max(kPTRCi , |psj ∩ σ|)
end for
if kPTRCi < θi then
Alert PTRCi
end if
end for
for all IHMIi ∈ σ do
Validate Human()
end for
Algorithm 3 System level detection
4.4.3 Security analysis and evaluation
This section will explore the capabilities of the proposed system level detection algo-
rithm. The objective of the evaluation is to explore the feasible bounds of the detection
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approach against varying attack sophistication. Additionally, it will explore trade-offs in
attack impacts, false positives, and false negatives.
4.4.3.1 False positives
The efficacy of the proposed approach requires that the number of false positives
remain under some acceptable threshold. The algorithm only raises alerts when the
number of observed relay pickups are below a threshold, θ. Therefore, this section will
infer the various sources of false positives, specifically from undesired relay tripping and
failed relays, and then relate them to this threshold.
Undesired tripping A false positive will arise if the relay fails and initiates an
“undesired tripping” event. Because the relay misoperates, there will not be any associ-
ated relays identifying the fault in the protection scheme. Therefore, this event will result
in an alert and will strongly resemble a situation where a single relays is compromised
and then initiated a trip. Fortunately, these events are very rare due to the reliability of
relays. Research has documented that only 36 inadvertent trips occurred between 1984
and 1999 [71], therefore, this error type will not produce large number of false positives.
Failed relay or communication In addition to undesired trip events, false posi-
tives could occur due to errors in the pickup or operation of relays during an actual fault.
This could either occur due to a failed relay or communication channel. In either case,
all elements in psi will not be obtained by the system level analysis algorithm which will
then return an error. This class of false positives presents a direct trade-off with the
level of effort required for an attacker to perform an undetectable coordinated attack.
To compute the likelihood of a failed relay causing a false positive, every relays will
be assumed to operate successfully with probability, p. Because there are multiple relays
in each protection scheme, a failure in any one relay could cause the protection scheme
to report back an incomplete set of values for each psi. If all relays have the same
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Figure 4.7 Probability of failures in protection scheme operations
probability of success, then the probability of the protection scheme operating correctly
determined by p|psi|. These values are demonstrated in Fig. 4.7, assuming the relays
operate successfully 90% (black) and 99% (gray) of the time.
To ensure the MHINDS does not consistently result in false positives, the number of
relay pickups that can reliably be expected to be identified should be reduced to account
for possible faults. By assuming that only a percentage of the relays can be expected to
operate for each protection scheme, a maximum bound can be identified to determine
number of relays that can be required to achieve some desired false positive rates. The
binomial distribution is used to compute a threshold value k, such that the probability of
a false positive stays under 5% based on some probability of relay success is p. Therefore,
some value k is needed such that Pr(X ≤ 5%) = ∑k1 = (nk)pkqn−k, where n = |psi| is
the number of relays in the protection scheme and q = p− 1.
Fig. 4.8 demonstrates the number of relay threshold, θi, that must successfully re-
port from each psi in order to ensure a false positive rate below the desire threshold.
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Notice that if the relays are 99% reliable, they more relays can be required by the anal-
ysis algorithm which increases the level of effort required for an attacker to perform an
unobservable coordinated attack. Therefore, there is a direct correlation between relay
reliability and the level of effort for an attacker to avoid detection.
4.4.3.2 False negatives
The system level analysis has detection limitations based on the number of devices
an attacker is able to control. If the attacker intends to attack a protection scheme
while remaining undetected, they must be able to successfully spoof the operations of
all devices in some protection scheme, psi, in order to ensure that the events correspond
the expected fault pickup and operation events. The occurrence where a protection
scheme is a subset of the number compromised devices, θi ⊆ attacked(di), is defined as
an undetectable coordinated attack as it will require the coordination of all devices within
the targeted protection scheme.
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Figure 4.9 Attacks required to spoof protection operation
Protection schemes for various system components will include a varying number of
relays. Therefore, launching an undetectable coordinated attack against each scheme will
require a varying effort for the attack based on the value of θi. Fig. 4.9 demonstrates the
level of effort for each attack based on the number of relays and substations an attacker
must compromise in order to initiate an undetectable coordinated attack against that
grid component from the system in Fig. 4.5.
4.4.3.3 Attack impact analysis
While Fig. 4.9 demonstrated the level of effort needed to launch an undetectable
coordinated attack against one protection scheme, an advanced attacker may try to co-
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Figure 4.10 Relay detectable vs undetectable attacks
ordinate attacks against multiple protection schemes in order to remove multiple system
components simultaneously. The electric grid is currently operated on an N-1 contin-
gency analysis which mandates that grid operators ensure grid reliability remains intact
if any one component is removed. Therefore, a sophisticated attacker may focus on
removing multiple system components in order to cause increased system damage.
Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 demonstrate the minimal level of effort in terms of number
of relays and number of substations that an attacker must compromise in order to cause
some number of de-energizing power lines assuming that main relays trip the breakers,
assuming θi = |psi|. These figures demonstrate that attacker level of effort scales accord-
ingly to the number of power lines they intend to remove. While an attack that causes
lines to be de-energized may result in neighboring lines being removed from the power
system due to overload, this analysis assumes that attacks occur instantaneously and
does not account for cascading failures.
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CHAPTER 5. CPS SECURITY TESTBED FOR THE
SMART GRID
5.1 Introduction
Attempts to research cyber security enhancements are constrained by the availability
of realistic cyber-physical environments. Testbeds that integrate both cyber and physical
components provide ideal environments to perform and evaluate research efforts. Unfor-
tunately, the testbed development process is not well established due to the complexity of
integrating cyber and physical resources while also incorporating simulation mechanisms
to model power systems, cyber network dynamics, and security events. Various design
strategies will naturally lend themselves to different research areas, therefore, an under-
standing of development constraints is important to enhance future efforts. This paper
provides a review of key testbed research applications and also presents a conceptual
testbed architecture.
This section then documents the implementation of the PowerCyber cyber-physical
testbed which integrates industry supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
hardware and software along with emulation and simulation techniques to provide an ac-
curate electric grid cyber infrastructure. The testbed employs virtualization technologies
to address scalability concerns and reduce development cost. The testbed has also been
integrated with the Internet-Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment (ISEAGE)
project at Iowa State to provide wide-area network emulation and advanced attack simu-
lation. Power simulations are performed with a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for
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real time evaluations and DIgSILIENT PowerFactory software for non-real time analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 enumerates previous
testbed development efforts and identifies salient features of those efforts. Section 5.3
introduces applications of a cyber security testbed based on current research demands
and testbed capabilities. Section 5.4 provides an introduction of the PowerCyber testbed
at Iowa State and presents a thorough review of its capabilities. Finally, Section 5.5
demonstrates the utility of the testbed by presenting various research efforts currently
being performed in the environment.
Figure 5.1 Testbed applications
5.2 Related work
Smart grid testbed have been developed at various universities and national labs to re-
search cyber security concerns. A foundational testbed initiative is the National SCADA
Test Bed (NSTB) which represents a national lab collaborative project. This environ-
ment implements actual physical grid components including generation and transmission,
while also incorporating industry standard software products [44]. Resulting research on
the testbed has identified numerous cyber vulnerabilities and contributed to the produc-
tion of SCADA-specific security assessment methodologies [45][69]. Unfortunately, the
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substantial cost of deploying purely physical testbed limits the practicality of similar
efforts.
Sandia National Laboratory developed the Virtual Control System Environment
(VCSE) which integrates simulation, emulation, and physical systems to provide more
cost-effective and reconfigurable platform [74, 72]. VCSE utilizes OPNET System-in-the-
Loop emulation to allow the integration of physical network devices with the simulated
network. This enables communication between both physical and emulated PLCs and the
PowerWorld power system simulator. VCSE also utilizes a centralized model/simulation
management tool, Umbra, to provide control over the various components. VCSE was
designed to provide support for operator training, vulnerability exploration, mitigation
development, and evaluation activities.
A similar project at the University of Illinois has produced the Virtual Power System
Testbed (VPST) which also combines both simulation and physical elements [22]. The
testbed is similar to VCSE as it uses a PowerWorld power system simulator, while
network integration is based on the Illinois-developed Real-Time Immersive Network
Simulation Environment (RINSE) project. These components are then integrated with
physical devices and industry-standard software products to provide a realistic control
environment.
The European CRUTIAL project has deployed two different testbeds to explore im-
pacts from various attack scenarios [31, 30]. The first testbed is focused primarily on
telecommunications within the electric grid by evaluating the transmission of IEC 60870-
5-104 traffic between a set of simulated substations and control centers. Specific experi-
ments have focused on evaluating the communication system’s ability to withstand vari-
ous denial of service (DoS) attacks. Additionally, a microgrid evaluation testbed has been
developed through the interconnection of a physical microgrid environment controlled by
emulated IED devices. The intelligent electronic devices (IED) then communicate over a
local area nework (LAN) to a Matlab/Simulink system which performs the resulting con-
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trols. This environment is being used to identify potential vulnerabilities in distributed
energy resources (DER) implementations.
The Testbed for Analyzing Security of SCADA Control Systems (TASSCS) has been
developed at the University of Arizona to perform anomaly-based intrusion detection re-
search [62]. The testbed utilizes OPNET System-in-the-Loop network emulation similar
to Sandia’s VCSE and also utilizes PowerWorld software to provide a simulated elec-
tric grid. A simulation-based control solution is presented using Modbus RSim software
which then communicates with the PowerWorld simulator.
A testbed at the University College Dublin (UCD) is based on industry standard
software/hardware with a DIgSILENT power system simulator to provide an environ-
ment to both identify attacks and evaluate physical impact [41]. Research on intrusion
and anomaly detection capabilities is being performed within this environment.
Finally, the SCADASim testbed has been developed at Royal Melbourne Institute
of Technology (RMIT) University to enable the exploration of network performance
under cyber attack [85]. The SCADASim testbed focuses on developing an emulated
communication infrastructure that can be used to interconnect physical devices utilizing
common SCADA protocols. The testbed can then be used to analyze how cyber attacks
impact the system’s communication requirements.
5.3 Testbed research applications and design
The review of previous development efforts has demonstrated numerous research ap-
plications currently being supported with testbeds. This section provides a more thor-
ough analysis of research efforts which benefit from a cyber-physical testbed. It then
introduces high-level testbed design elements and presents a mapping of these applica-
tion dependencies on testbed control, communication, and physical elements.
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5.3.1 Research applications
A comprehensive set of testbed applications are identified in Fig. 5.1 and elaborated
upon in greater detail below.
5.3.1.1 Vulnerability research
Cyber-physical systems utilize different software, hardware, communications proto-
cols and physical media. Many of the technologies used within this environment are
not publicly available which significantly constrains the amount of vulnerability research
that can performed by security researchers. Fortunately, testbeds provide areas where
vulnerability assessment activities can be performed, including vulnerability scanning,
cryptography analysis, and software testing methods such as fuzzing. Other testbed
environments, such as the National SCADA Test Bed, have been utilized to identify nu-
merous cyber vulnerabilities in various control system components [46, 45]. This research
will help ensure that software platforms, configurations, and network architectures have
been adequately analyzed for weaknesses.
5.3.1.2 Impact analysis
Another key testbed application is the evaluation of physical impacts from different
types of cyber security attacks and incidents [14]. The complexity and interdependencies
within both the cyber and physical systems complicate current impact analysis methods.
Testbeds help capture the risk posed by a particular security event through the ability
to determine impact on grid stability and power flow. Various attack strategies can be
explored including sophisticated coordinated attacks and insider threats. Additionally,
various power system topologies, operator responses, and cyber vulnerabilities can be
explored to determine their ability to mitigate physical system impacts.
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5.3.1.3 Mitigation evaluation
Testbeds also present a useful environment to explore the effectiveness of various
mitigation strategies. Mitigation efforts should attempt to reduce the vulnerability of
the cyber infrastructure while increasing the robustness of the power applications [94].
One particular area where testbeds will be useful is in the development of attack resilient
control algorithms that can be evaluated within a realistic environment to explore their
performance and reliability.
5.3.1.4 Cyber-physical metrics
The development of cyber-physical metrics is imperative to improving cyber secu-
rity and increasing grid resiliency. Testbeds produce an environment where controlled
evaluations can be performed to support metric development and evaluation. This is
specifically relevant within the cyber-physical systems as metrics must combine multiple
domains. On the physical side, metrics can be evaluated based on the impact to power
flow, stability, and even markets. Cyber security metrics can incorporate vulnerability
criticality (such as CVSS [89]), vulnerability patch installation rates, and other methods
to explore both system correctness and organizational security objectives [79].
5.3.1.5 Data and model development
Currently real world data about the electric grid’s cyber resources and vulnerabilities
are limited as they are sensitive to the utility’s operation. Testbed environments may also
help develop models and datasets which can be disseminated to researchers to facilitate
more accurate analysis and results. Models and datasets could incorporate power system
models, network architectures, protocols, and data.
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5.3.1.6 Security validation
Cyber security compliance requirements (e.g., NERC CIP [82]) are becoming increas-
ingly common as a means to ensure critical resources are appropriately protected. Unfor-
tunately, the process of evaluating security mechanisms is not well established within this
environment. The electric grid’s high availability demands and the heavy utilization of
proprietary systems limit the applicability of common vulnerability scanning techniques
[23]. Since the effectiveness of compliance depends heavily on the security validation pro-
cess, effective methods are required to ensure requirements are appropriately enforced.
Testbed environments that implement industry standard software and configurations
can help understand both impacts and effectiveness of traditional security assessment
techniques while also presenting an environment where new methods can be explored.
5.3.1.7 Interoperability
Testbeds also present a distinct opportunity to explore system interoperability within
a realistic environment. This may be beneficial for both vendor products and research
efforts from industry, academia, and national laboratories. Interoperability testing may
include activities such as 1) communication/protocol connectivity, 2) realistic availability
requirements, 3) data collection and aggregation requirements, and 4) operator interface
design evaluation.
5.3.1.8 Cyber forensics
Cyber-based forensics presents another important area of future research [66]. Field
devices depend heavily on embedded systems which utilize different operating systems
and software platforms. Recent events have also shown that cyber attacks can be used to
modify the operational logic of programmable logic controllers (PLC) [36]. Without some
ability to forensically analyze these devices, there is little chance of detecting intrusions.
Testbeds play a key role in this analysis as they present an environment where device
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Figure 5.2 Logical testbed architecture
functionality can be analyzed, specifically, whether they respond correctly to commands
and return accurate measurements.
5.3.1.9 Operator training
Cyber incidents may be responsible for unusual power system failures, especially when
combined with physical faults [56]. Testbeds present the opportunity to both analyze
these situations and demonstrate how a realistic attack would look to system operators.
Therefore, testbeds may provide training applications to help identify differentiated fail-
ures from both cyber and physical.
5.3.2 Testbed design elements
This section presents a high-level overview of testbed components and their support
of testbed applications. Testbed components can be categorized into communication,
control and power systems elements. Fig. 5.2 shows a logical testbed architecture and
specifically identifies these components. The diagram first displays how measurements
and actuations are either sensed from physical devices, 1a, or simulated and transmitted
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over network, 1b. Item 2 displays how information such as device statuses, commands,
and protection functions are transmitted through the substation. Item 3 demonstrates
the substation communications to other systems in the wide area network (WAN) for
regional control and energy management functions. Finally, item 4 shows WAN commu-
nication between control centers for system scheduling and status data.
Table 5.1 identifies the requirements for the testbed’s control, communication, and
physical system components in order to support the previously identified research initia-
tives. The following list identifies the various testbed components in this table.
• Software - the various SCADA and energy management system (EMS) applications
that monitor and control the physical system.
• Hardware - the IEDs and PLCs that bridge the cyber and physical domains.
• Algorithms - the logic to calculate grid observability and perform automated control
functions.
• Protocols - the numerous real-worlds SCADA network protocols.
• Architectures - accuracy of the network layout to current smart grid network topolo-
gies.
• Performance - similarities between the networks throughput and latency.
• Scalability - the size of the the power system that can be simulated.
• Real-Time - the simulators ability to compute updated grid state in real-time.
• HW Interface - whether the power system simulator can be interfaced with the
actual IEDs.
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5.4 ISU’s PowerCyber testbed architecture
This section describes the architecture and capabilities of the PowerCyber testbed at
Iowa State University (ISU), specifically highlighting the communication, control, and
physical system simulation components. The testbed currently utilizes an array of real,
emulated, and simulated components to provide a realistic cyber and physical environ-
ment [5]. Fig. 5.3 demonstrates the testbed’s architecture, which will be elaborated upon
in the remainder of this section.
5.4.1 Control
The control functions within the electric grid consist of a variety of human-in-the-
loop and closed loop mechanisms used to manage the grid’s reliability and efficiency.
The grid’s control mechanisms can be divided into those performed by the centralized
control centers and those distributed into the substations. The testbed utilizes industry
standard software for all control functions to enable realistic cyber vulnerability research.
5.4.1.1 Control center
The testbed’s control center is configured to support general SCADA functions, which
includes collecting measurements and device statuses from field devices, forwarding op-
erator commands to various field devices, and managing historic data about system op-
erations. These functions are supported with industry standard SCADA servers, Human
Machine Interfaces (HMIs) and Historian servers.
Control operations within the control center focus on human-in-the-loop approaches.
The SCADA communications occurs between the SCADA servers and a software-based
remote terminal units (RTU) system located within each substation. The SCADA server
polls the status of the substation’s various devices every second and displays the acquired
information to the operator through the HMI. The operator can then choose to modify
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system’s operation by sending commands to the substations. All of the data collected
by the control center is then stored within the historian server for future analysis.
5.4.1.2 Substations
In addition to the control center, the testbed also includes substations to interface
with the power system simulations. Substations consists of both RTUs and IEDs. Sub-
stations within the testbed are modeled two ways: 1) using a combination of dedicated
RTU systems connected to physical IEDs (overcurrent protection relays) and 2) using
virtualized substations connected directly to virtual IEDs modeled by the power system
simulators. In both scenarios the RTUs are responsible for aggregating data from either
physical or virtualized IEDs and transmitting it back to the control center. The IEDs
within the environment are over-current protection relays which can be used to perform
current and voltage measurements from transmission lines and then communicated with
RTUs.
Control functions within the substation include both protection and human-in-the-
loop control methods. Various automated protection functions can also be configured
between the physical IEDs. The IEDs can be dynamically configured to transmit their
status and detected faults to other IEDs to ensure they are automatically cleared before
system damage occurs.
5.4.2 Communication
The important components of the communication infrastructure include both the
physical network architecture and network protocols. Supporting the grid’s wide array
of monitoring and control functions requires numerous LAN and WAN environments,
along with specialized communication protocols.
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5.4.2.1 Wide area networks
Communication between the control center and substation RTUs is performed with
the Distributed Network Protocols (DNP3) protocol similar to many real-world SCADA
systems. DNP3 currently operates over IP to enable routeable networks. Since the WAN
will be externally exposed, the communication is protected in transit with IPSec-based
virtual private networks (VPNs) implemented with industry specific network security
devices. In addition to the use of DNP3, the ISEAGE project has been integrated into
the lab to replicate the scale and exposure properties of a real WAN.
ISEAGE : The ISEAGE testbed was developed independently to provide a scalable
Internet environment to perform cyber attack and defense simulations [32]. ISEAGE in-
tegration within the testbed provides the following benefits: 1) large cyber infrastructure
modeling, 2) network traffic collection, and 3) coordinated attack simulation.
The core function of ISEAGE is a configurable emulation of an IP-based routing
topology. ISEAGE will emulate a desired network topology while providing physical
interfaces to the various network segments to support integration with physical networks
and devices. By utilizing ISEAGE, the PowerCyber lab can be expanded to provide
a realistic network path for its WAN communication. Communication between control
centers and substations will route across the ISEAGE emulated network. This can then
be utilized to perform various attack studies, specifically focusing on availability and in-
tegrity requirements of the network. DoS attacks can be simulated to understand network
availability requirements and determine communication link resiliency and redundancy
requirements.
5.4.2.2 Substations
Within the substations, the IEC 61850 protocol is used to communicate status and
commands between both other IEDs and the RTU. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages utilize
multicast Ethernet to provide real-time support for protection mechanisms and is used for
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communications between IEDs. Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocols
are used to communicate analog and binary values between the IEDs and RTUs.
5.4.3 Physical system
The testbed currently deploys two different tools for performing power system sim-
ulation, DIgSILENT PowerFactory and a RTDS [29, 88]. These simulators are used
independently based on the time constraints of the simulation. The power system model
for both simulators is based on the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
9-bus model as demonstrated in Fig. 5.3. The system consists of three generating units
at buses 1, 2 and 3, and three loads at buses 5, 6 and 8. Nine substations are modeled,
such that each substation controls the operations (breaker control) concerned with a bus.
5.4.3.1 Real Time Digital Simulator
The RTDS is a simulation platform that provides the capability to perform real-time
power system simulation and allows physical hardware integration and can closely mimic
the physical response characteristics of power system equipment when subjected to fault-
type scenarios. The RTDS was designed to both interact with physical relays (IEDs)
and through various control system protocols, such as IEC 61850 and DNP. This allows
integration with both the physical and virtualized relays.
5.4.3.2 DIgSILENT PowerFactory
PowerFactory is a software product that performs non-real-time power system sim-
ulation. Additionally, unlike the RTDS, PowerFactory does not provide interconnection
of physical devices. However, PowerFactory does provide some advantages to RTDS as
it allows the simulation of larger systems with limited real-time constraints. In addition,
PowerFactory provides more advanced system analysis capabilities, including algorithms
for state estimation and contingency analysis. PowerFactory communicates with the
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testbed components through the Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process
Control (OPC) protocol.
5.5 Testbed evaluation and experimentation
This section reviews current research efforts performed on the testbed. First a high-
level overview of current vulnerabilities assessment activities is provided. Next, a more
detailed analysis of various cyber-physical attack scenarios is presented to demonstrate
both isolated and coordinated attacks that impact physical system stability.
5.5.1 Vulnerability assessment
Numerous vulnerability assessment activities have been performed on the testbed to
explore potential security weaknesses in the software and communication protocols. Dis-
covered vulnerabilities are then shared with the product vendor so they can develop and
release appropriate mitigations. Our vulnerability identification process has followed well
documented security testing methodologies, such as NIST 800-115: “Technical Guide to
Information Security Testing and Assessment”, which focuses on various scanning and
cracking techniques along with a thorough review of implemented technologies and config-
urations [53]. In addition to the documented methodology, our analysis has also included
manual inspection techniques using various open-source tools and software fuzzing tests
based on the Mu Security Analyzer [78].
The resulting analysis has resulted in the discovery of multiple previously undisclosed
vulnerabilities within industry software platforms. These efforts have resulted in vendor
security advisories and system patches [91].
5.5.2 Cyber-physical impacts
In addition to the vulnerability assessment efforts, various cyber-physical impact
evaluations have been performed to explore how attacks can impact the physical sys-
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Table 5.2 Evaluated cyber attacks
Attack 1: Malicious Breaker Trip
Method Command injection
Origin Internal
Tool Custom software
Target IED
Result Breaker trip
Attack 2: SCADA Observability DoS
Method DoS - TCP Syn flood
Origin External
Tool Mu Security Analyzer [78]
Target VPN/Firewall
Result Unobservable Power System
Attack 3: Remedial Action Scheme DoS
Method DoS - TCP Syn/L2 flood
Origin Internal
Tool Mu Security Analyzer [78]
Target Switch/Relay
Result Failed Protection Scheme
tems. Table 5.2 identifies the three attack templates that have been evaluated within
the testbed. The remainder of this section will provide further analysis of these situa-
tions.
5.5.2.1 Attack 1: Malicious breaker trip
This attack scenarios assumes an attacker is able to access an internal network by
bypassing the security of either the control center or substation networks. Once this level
of access has been obtained, the attacker can initiate their own DNP3 connections to the
RTUs due to insufficient authentication requirements. The lack of system authentication
is then used to inject a breaker trip command to breaker 1 on bus 1.
The power system is stable when the simulation begins. In 7 seconds the malicious
breaker trip command is injected to the network. Once this occurs, generator rotor angles
become unsynchronized. Once the breaker is tripped, generator 1 is separated from the
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Figure 5.4 Generator rotor angles
rest of this system. The loss of generation creates a large system disturbance which
caused the remaining online generators to become unsynchronized. Fig. 5.4 identifies
the rotor angle of generators 2 and 3 during the attack.
5.5.2.2 Attack 2: SCADA observability DoS
DoS attacks present another significant concern due to the electric grid’s strict avail-
ability requirements. In this scenario the attacker floods the VPN’s external interface
with arbitrary data in order to disrupt the SCADA communications. This attack assumes
a external attacker is targeting the external VPN interface with a Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) Syn flood attack. Because the VPN is used to protection the SCADA
DNP3 traffic, flooding the VPN will constrain its ability to transmit the SCADA traffic
between the control center and substation. The control center is currently configured to
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Figure 5.5 DoS impact on control system communication
poll system status every 1 second with DNP3 packets.
Cyber impact : Fig. 5.5 documents the results of the DoS evaluation by plotting the
mean throughput from 5 simulations, the x-axis documents the length of the attack
while the y-axis displays the number of probe DNP3 packets received every ten seconds.
These results show that as the attack throughput increases, the DNP3 communication
decreases. At 10 megabits per second (Mbps) the availability starts to decrease and
once the DoS attack reaches approximately 20 Mbps the VPN devices are no longer to
properly relay the DNP3 traffic between the substation and control center.
Physical system impact : Once the attack reaches 20 Mbps, the control system be-
gins to obtain a decreasing number of SCADA measurements. These measurements
are necessary to compute the state estimations of the physical system and other EMS
applications.
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5.5.2.3 Attack 3: Remedial Action Scheme DoS
In this particular case study, we show how the testbed can be used to replicate the
conditions of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and study the impact of a coordinated
cyber attack on the power system. Typically, for every RAS, there is a RAS controller,
which determines when the scheme is to be armed and also sends appropriate control
commands to the corresponding relays. Because RAS are very critical in maintaining the
system stability, they are often deployed with another redundant backup RAS controller
and protection elements, however, for the purpose of this case study, only one controller
is modeled.
Fig. 5.3, labeled “PowerCyber testbed architecture”, displays the WECC 9 bus system
that was chosen as the power system for our case study. The particular RAS which has
been adapted for this case study has been taken from the WECC RAS list[111] and is
explained below.
Figure 5.6 RAS physical and cyber system
The RAS scheme is designed to trip one of the generation units at bus 2, (modeled
by a reduction in the generation), if there is a fault on one of the transmission lines
connected to it. In our case there are two transmission lines, namely, 7 − 8 and 7 − 5.
The RAS scheme would be armed only if generation at bus 2 exceeds a particular value.
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This generation would have to be reduced to prevent the thermal overloading of one of
the transmission lines in case of a fault on the other line and also to maintain the stability
of the generation units. Table 5.3 shows how the various components of the RAS have
been mapped into the PowerCyber testbed environment.
Table 5.3 Mapping of PowerCyber testbed components to RAS
Component in RAS Mapping in PowerCy-
ber testbed
RAS controller Relay 1
Relay protecting line 7-5 Relay 2
Relay protecting line 7-8 Relay 3 (inside RTDS)
Relay causing generation reduc-
tion at bus 2
Relay 4 (inside RTDS)
i) Coordinated attack template: The case study involves the execution of a coordinated
attack to prevent the RAS from operating, reducing the loading on the transmission line
7 − 8 and consequently tripping of the line 7 − 8. Assuming that the RAS is already
armed, i.e generation at bus 2 greater than a specified threshold, the actions which are
necessary to cause this are:
1. Creating a data integrity attack (similar to section V-B-1) to trip the Relay 2 which
protects line 7− 5 to activate the RAS.
2. Creating a Denial of Service attack to prevent the GOOSE trip command to the
generation unit at bus 2 to result in a thermal overload on line 7− 8 and cause it
to trip out.
By looking at Fig. 5.6, we can explain how the RAS operates by observing the se-
quence of events and IEC 61850 messages being exchanged between the devices associ-
ated with this protection scheme. Generally, the control center operator can manually
arm/disarm the RAS through an IEC 61850 message to the RAS controller directly
outside the typical flow of events.
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Figure 5.7 DoS protection scheme impact (switch flooding)
1. The Generating station at bus 2 exceeds a threshold, communicates this to the
RAS controller (Relay 1) to arm the RAS.
2. Relay 2 associated with the protected line 7 − 5 sends a message to the RAS
controller to indicate a fault.
3. RAS controller performs the necessary validation checks and issues a trip command
to the unit at generating station in bus 2 to reduce generation immediately.
4. Because of the successful cyber attack, generation at bus 2 is not reduced and the
Relay 3 protecting line 7− 8 detects thermal overload.
5. Relay 3 reaches max time for withstanding the thermal overload and trips, isolating
the generation station at bus 2.
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Figure 5.8 DoS protection scheme impact (relay Syn flood)
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ii) Cyber impact : We evaluate two DoS attacks which could be used to disrupt the
RAS communication, first by flooding the switch with broadcast Ethernet frames and
also flooding the RAS controller with TCP Syn packets. We evaluate various traffic rates
to determine the amount of malicious traffic required to disrupt the RAS, each attack
was repeated ten times. The results of this analysis shows that the protection scheme
can be disrupted through both methods, though targeting the RAS controller requires
significantly less bandwidth.
Fig. 5.7 demonstrates the impact of the DoS attack by flooding the Ethernet switch.
Fig. 5.7A displays that the percentage of times that RAS failed based on various attack
rates. Notice as traffic hits 50 Mbps the RAS fails 50% of the time while at greater
attack rates the RAS fails consistently. Fig. 5.7B displays averaged time for the RAS
communication to travel from the relay to the RAS controller and back (note: these
results only include successful RAS methods as the communication never finishes in
the failed scenarios). Although RAS only fails after not receiving the communication
within 1 second, our results show either the communication occurred within 200ms or
the RAS failed. This occurrence can likely be explained by Ethernet’s collision detection
exponential back-off and eventual collision timeout.
The results from the TCP Syn flood attack in Fig. 5.8 demonstrate that the protec-
tion scheme could be disrupted with significantly less bandwidth by targeting the relay.
Fig. 5.8A shows that traffic around 1.5 Mbps is sufficient to disrupt the RAS 60% of the
time, while as traffic reaches 2 Mbps the RAS continually fails. Fig. 5.8B displays the
average delay of the RAS during successful runs.
iii) Physical system impact : The impact of the successful coordinated attack on
the power system can be seen from Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.10. Fig. 5.9 shows how the
system voltages are impacted by the attack and Fig. 5.10 shows how the line flows and
the generation changed as a result of the attack. Each of these figures have two ovals
highlighting the two events which took place as part of the attack. The first event
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represents the tripping of line 7− 5, and could have been either a fault or an attack (in
our case), and the second event represents the tripping of line 7− 8 due to the attack.
Fig. 5.9 shows that the first event did not cause much impact on the system voltage
and the voltage at all the buses stayed close to 1.0 p.u. Whereas, after the second
line tripped, generator two was completely isolated from the grid and this impacted the
voltage at several buses significantly. This especially occurs at bus 7, which is linked to
bus 2 through a step-up transformer.
From Fig. 5.10, we can see that the tripping of line 7− 5 changed the generation in
all three generators by a small amount, but it overloaded the line 7− 8 significantly and
eventually preventing the generation reduction as per the RAS, it led to the tripping
of line 7 − 8. Although the plot shows the tripping of 7 − 8 due to overload within
seconds, the scenario would have resulted in the same impact even after a longer thermal
limit threshold, which is typically around a few minutes. It is to be noted here that the
tripping of line 7 − 8 completely isolates generator 2 from the system and therefore it
would result in a huge loss of generation which will impact the frequency profoundly.
In a real power system such an event could potentially cause some frequency stability
related problems. This situation could also lead to tripping of some load if no spare
generation is available.
Note: The simulated power system used in this attack was not operating in a N-1
secure state as is required for the North American grid, therefore, the demonstrated
attack would unlikely result in similar load and frequency violations on the actual grid.
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Figure 5.9 Impact of attack on system voltages
Figure 5.10 Impact of attack on generation and line flows
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Critical infrastructures have gained increased concern as targets from future cyber
attacks. The electric power grid is extremely dependent on cyber infrastructures to per-
form automated monitoring and control functions. Smart grid initiatives, such as AMI,
WAMS, and substation automation will significantly expand this dependency. The expo-
sure of these ICT assets and their increasing adoption in smart grid initiatives introduces
numerous concerns questioning the adequacy of the grids current security posture. AMI
presents both utilities and consumers with improved control over their electricity con-
sumption. However, this large infrastructure presents numerous vulnerabilities which
could be exploited by attackers to cut off power, falsify billing data, or access sensitive
consumer privacy data. WAMS will incorporate PMUs to improve the accuracy of state
estimation of the bulk power system. Although if critical PMU data is manipulated by
an attacker, utilities may compute incorrect estimations which may result in improper
control actions. Additionally, increased substation automation attempts to improve the
reliability of critical control and protection applications. However, if an attacker is able
to gain access to substation systems, they could trip breakers to cause significant damage
to the grid.
Recent government reports have identified numerous cyber security shortcomings
within the grid including missing patches, poor system configurations, insufficient com-
munication protection, and inadequate intrusion detection capabilities. While grid se-
curity mechanisms are weak, cyber attacks are being identified with greater frequency
and sophistication. Recently advanced APT tactics, such as Stuxnet, demonstrate the
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feasibility of cyber-physical malware that can usurp a control system in order to manip-
ulated a physical system. More secure systems must be developed to provide sufficient
resiliency to cyber attack. Although a wealth of research has been performed address-
ing traditional cyber security paradigms, many solutions do not adequately address the
additional constraints required to support the electric grid.
This dissertation identifies three key contributions that will enhance the security of
the smart grid. First, it presents novel models and metrics for evaluating the security
posture of the smart grid. It presents a graph-based model integrating known information
about system privileges and critical information in the architecture based on the contents
of the CIM. Then an exposure metric is computed for each CIM object to represent its
vulnerability to attack. Various applications of this model are then explored on an
example AMI architecture, including comparisons of the efficacy of different security
enhancements and methods to calculate the impact that a new vulnerability in the
system.
Next, a model-based intrusion detection system is designed to identify attacks against
electric substations. This work extends previous smart grid IDS research in that it incor-
porated a Petri net model to support both temporal and spatial analysis of substation
events. Additionally, it uses a hierarchical approach by collecting and processing events
within the substation, and then passing them to the system level where they can be ana-
lyzed to correlate physical events and identify coordinated attacks. The approach is then
demonstrated based on the IEC 61850 protocol and recently published research papers
demonstrating smart grid substation applications. The results show that attacks can
be reliably detected unless the attacker is able to perform a sophisticated coordinated
attach which compromises all relays within a protection scheme.
Finally, this work introduces the cyber-physical PowerCyber testbed. The testbed is
an accurate representation of both cyber and physical elements of the smart grid so that
research can be explored within a controlled environment. The testbed’s design strategies
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are presented including trade-offs on cost, scalability, and accuracy. The testbed’s hybrid
architecture is then introduced including its integration of physical and emulated control,
communication, and power system components. Finally, the dissertation demonstrates
the testbed’s utility to research applications with the execution of various vulnerability
assessment activities, as well as integrity and availability attacks and their resulting
impact on grid stability.
6.1 Future work
While this research presents multiple contributions to the area smart grid cyber
security, continued research is needed in all three domains. Research on models and
metrics is imperative to ensure risk can be accurately evaluated, which is critical to the
selection of appropriate security mechanisms. As demonstrated by this research, CIMs
present a novel way to look at the information which must be stored and communicated
in order to support smart grid operations. Future risk analysis and modeling approaches
should focus on identifying how vulnerable elements of the CIM are to attack, but should
further incorporate physical system impact analysis to evaluate the true risk to the power
grid. Essentially, these approaches should more strongly emphasize the cyber-physical
relationship of the smart grid.
Continued research is need in intrusion detection approaches for the smart grid.
MHINDS demonstrates how deterministic control network properties can be combined
with spatial and temporal analysis of both cyber and physical events to accurately iden-
tify malicious control communications. This research should be expanded in multiple
ways.
First, future research should incorporate greater awareness about the operation of
substation protections schemes into the model. This should be incorporated into the
detection algorithms to reduce false positives and negatives. This research focus should
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closely parallel related efforts in fault location algorithms. In addition, future research
should explore similar spatial and temporal approaches on other power system applica-
tions, potentially including applications in control centers and AMI. Future work should
focus on the continued development of the research so that the contributions can be
realized first within the PowerCyber testbed and then in real-world smart grid systems.
Finally, continued research is needed to explore pragmatic methods to extend the
testbed’s accuracy and usability. The testbed’s accuracy can be improved by increasing
the size of the simulations, including both the cyber and physical systems. Larger power
systems are helpful to explore the dynamic properties of power systems. In addition,
larger power systems must be accompanied by larger control system and communication
networks. The accuracy of the testbed can also be improved by integrating more control
algorithms used within the electric grid, specifically protection schemes, state estima-
tion, AGC, and contingency analysis. The ability to explore an attacks impact to these
algorithms is critical to accurately evaluating the effectiveness of novel mitigation strate-
gies. Finally, the testbed requires greater research into the development of a platform
which can be remotely accessible. This environment should be accessible to researchers
both within and external to ISU to facilitate both educational research efforts. Users
must be able to easily configure the various power system topologies, control algorithms,
control architectures, and security mechanisms to understand cyber attacks impact and
to explore methods to enhance the security of the smart grid.
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